Louisiana Tech University

Louisiana Tech Digital Commons
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

Fall 2014

Effects of psychological contract breaches on
mergers and acquisitions
Kristine M. Murphy
Louisiana Tech University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.latech.edu/dissertations
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Marketing Commons
Recommended Citation
Murphy, Kristine M., "" (2014). Dissertation. 217.
https://digitalcommons.latech.edu/dissertations/217

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Louisiana Tech Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Louisiana Tech Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@latech.edu.

EFFECTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT BREACHES
ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

by
Kristine M. Murphy, B.S., M.B.A.

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor o f Business Administration

COLLEGE OF BUSINESS
LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY

November 2014

UMI Number: 3662477

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

Di!ss0?t&Ciori P iiblist’Mlg

UMI 3662477
Published by ProQuest LLC 2015. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

August 31, 2014
Date

We

by

hereby

recommend

that

the

dissertation

prepared

under

our

supervision

Kristine Murphy

entitled_________________________________________________________________________________

Effects of Psychological Contract Breaches on Mergers and Acquisitions

be

accepted

in

partial

fulfillment

of

the

requirements

for

the

D egree

of

Doctor of Business Administration

'r. William Stanynerjohan Suneotisor o f Dissertation Research

Head o f Department

Accounting and Information Systems
Department

Immendatii

'r. Rebecca Bannett! Co-Chair

Dr. A ndrea Drake

Advisory Committee

A pproved:

Director o f

Dean o f the C ollege,

A pproved:

Studies. Dr. Tim Bisping

"Dean o f the Graduate S c h o o l, Dr. Sheryl Shoemaker
Shoe

Dr. Tim Bisping
GS Form 13a
(6/07)

ABSTRACT

This study investigates breaches in the psychological employment contract during
mergers and acquisitions. An employee’s contract is incomplete in regards to mergers
and acquisitions (M&A).

In its place, psychological contracts are formed.

Common

psychological contracts breached in the M&A process include raises, bonuses,
promotions, job responsibilities, job security, and career development. Employees who
have experienced an M&A were surveyed to test the severity o f various psychological
contract breaches and their effect on employee performance, organizational citizenship
behavior, job satisfaction, organizational deviance, and turnover using t-tests, Structural
Equation Modeling, and ANOVA. The mediating effect o f feelings o f violation was also
tested.

Because psychological contract breaches may be unavoidable, the mitigating

effect o f justice was tested, too.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Merger and acquisition decisions are made using accounting information,
including financial results and projections. Radcliffe, Campbell, and Fogarty state “all
acquisitions are based on expectations o f future increased earnings per share” (2001,
427). However, 30% to 50% o f mergers and acquisitions decrease shareholder value, and
60% to 80% o f mergers and acquisitions do not add any shareholder value (Boyle,
Carpenter, & Mahoney, 2012).

This implies that companies are making merger and

acquisition decisions on flawed financial projections.
One way in which these financial projections may be flawed is that unexpected
costs are incurred during mergers and acquisitions. Employees are greatly affected by
mergers and acquisitions, and unfortunately, employees’ expectations are often unmet
throughout the merger and acquisition process.

Employees’ reactions to these unmet

expectations can create unanticipated costs for companies, which were not included in the
initial financial projections. As stated by Mac Rory, a company’s “competitive advantage
really is in people” (1999).

A company’s employees are an important factor in the

ultimate success or failure o f a merger or acquisition.
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This research seeks to answer: (1) why many companies fail to realize the full
extent of anticipated benefits from a merger or acquisition, (2) during mergers and
acquisitions, do employees perceive the organization has failed to deliver promised
obligations, and (3) in the process o f a merger or acquisition, are employees’ feelings and
behaviors affected in a way that may ultimately reduce the expected benefits?
The literature stream on incomplete contracting demonstrates the prevalence of
incomplete contracts; virtually every contract is incomplete in some way. This includes
contracts between employers and employees (Christ, Emett, Summers, & Wood, 2012;
Falk, Gachter, & Kovacs, 1999). When an employment contract in incomplete, it leaves
room for psychological contracts to be formed by employees.
A psychological contract is a belief in a promise by an employee, an anticipatory
contribution made by the employee, and a perceived future obligation on the part o f the
organization to provide benefits to the employee (Rousseau, 1989). Smith (1993), Martin
(1995), Schofield (1996), Mac Rory (1999), Bruce (2001), and Classe (2004) all urge
practitioners to pay attention to employees’ psychological contracts. Bruce (2001) and
Classe (2004) specifically remark on the importance o f psychological contracts during
mergers and acquisitions because psychological contracts are frequently breached during
the merger and acquisition process. This dissertation studies the following psychological
contract breaches in a merger and acquisition setting: pay raises, bonuses, promotions,
job responsibilities, job security, and career development.
In response to breaches in psychological contracts, employees may experience
feelings o f violation, which are “affective and emotional experience[s] o f disappointment,
frustration, anger, and resentment that may emanate from an employee’s interpretation o f

a contract breach and its accompanying circumstances” (Morrison and Robinson 1997).
It is hypothesized that the psychological contract breaches o f pay raises, bonuses,
promotions, job responsibilities, job security, and career development lead to higher
feelings o f violation.

Organizational justice affects the way employees feel during

mergers and acquisitions, and it is posited that organizational justice mitigates the
relationship between psychological contracts and feelings o f violation.
This study examines the effects o f mergers and acquisitions on employee
performance,

organizational

citizenship

behavior

(OCB), job

satisfaction,

and

organizational deviance. Prior literature has shown that negative outcomes are associated
with changes in the psychological contracts from major organizational changes, such as
mergers and acquisitions (Bligh & Carsten, 2005; Cortvriend, 2004; Freese, Schalk, &
Croon, 2011; Hubbard & Purcell, 2001; Searle & Ball, 2004; Shield, Thorpe, & Nelson,
2002; Tumley & Feldman, 1998). It is hypothesized that feelings o f violation decrease
employee performance, OCB, and job satisfaction and increase organizational deviance.
It is also hypothesized that feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and employee performance, OCB, job satisfaction, and
organizational deviance.
In this dissertation, an online crowd-sourcing tool, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,
was used to survey people who experienced a merger or acquisition in the United Stated.
Previous studies used samples from one company or a select few companies that
experienced a major organizational change.

An online survey allows for the current

study to be based on a wide range o f companies and to also include employees who have
left the organization in the sample.

Established scales were used to measure the following constructs: psychological
contracts and feelings o f violation (Robinson & Morrison, 2000), employee performance
(Williams and Anderson 1991), organizational citizenship behavior (Lee & Allen, 2002),
job satisfaction (Russell et al., 2004), organizational deviance (Bennett & Robinson,
2000), and organizational justice (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009). Three attention check
questions were also included in the survey. These questions requested the respondents to
select a particular answer in order to test how closely they are reading and answering the
survey.

Mechanical Turk “Workers” who correctly answered the attention check

questions and completed the survey were paid $2.00 each. Five hundred observations
were collected, and 493 were usable in the final sample.
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test the hypotheses.

This

method was selected since the constructs used in this study are all latent constructs.
Model fit and validity were assessed, further supporting the use o f SEM. Multiple group
analysis was used to test the moderator organizational justice. The sample was split into
thirds based on the average score on the organizational justice scale. The top third was
used as the ‘high justice’ group, while the lowest third was used was the ‘low justice’
group.
The results from structural equation modeling reveals that all six o f the
psychological contract breaches (raises, bonuses, promotions, job responsibilities, job
security, and career development) did in fact lead to higher feelings o f violation. The
results from the multiple group analysis show that higher organizational justice
significantly reduces this relationship between psychological contract breaches o f raises,
promotions, job security, and career development and feelings o f violation. However,

justice did not significantly mitigate the relationship between the breaches o f bonuses and
job responsibilities and feelings o f violation.
The results also show the feelings o f violation associated with bonuses, job
responsibilities, job security, and career development lead to significantly decreased
employee performance. Similarly, feelings o f violation associated with all psychological
contract breaches, with the exception o f bonuses, significantly lowers organizational
citizenship behavior among employees.

Furthermore, employees’ job satisfaction is

significantly reduced by feelings o f violation from all types o f psychological contract
breaches.

Feelings o f violation also lead to a significant increase in organizational

deviance.

These outcomes (decreased performance, OCB, satisfaction and increased

deviance) are undesirable for companies, but especially those going through a merger or
acquisition.
In addition to testing the direct relationship between psychological contract
breaches and feelings o f violation and between feelings o f violation and performance,
OCB, job satisfaction, and organizational deviance, feelings o f violation were tested a
mediator. It was hypothesized that feelings o f violation has a mediating role in the direct
relationship between the psychological contract breaches and the outcomes o f
performance, OCB, job satisfaction, and organizational deviance.

The results suggest

that feelings o f violation have more o f a mediating role with the psychological contracts
that are relational in nature, which “entails broad, open-ended, and long-term obligations”
(Morrison and Robinson 1997, 229).
This dissertation contributes to several streams o f literature.

First, this study

extends the literature on incomplete employment contracts by investigating their effect on
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employee misconduct, performance, turnover, organizational citizenship behaviors, and
job satisfaction during the merger and acquisition process. This study also contributes to
the psychological contract literature.

A variety o f psychological contracts have been

studied in the accounting literature, including auditors’ job expectations (Herrbach,
2001), commitment to a rate o f return (Cheng, Schulz, Luckett, & Booth, 2003), bonuses
(Hayes & Schaefer, 2005), newly hired faculty’s job expectations (Duff & Monk, 2006),
promotions (Parker, Nouri, & Hayes, 2011), and job responsibilities and job security
(Williams and Adams 2013). This study furthers the work o f Hayes and Schaefer (2005)
on bonuses, Parker, Nouri, and Hayes (2011) on promotions, and Williams and Adams
(2013) on job security, by studying these psychological contracts in a merger and
acquisition setting.

This study also empirically tests the conjectures made by Bruce

(2001) and Classe (2004) that psychological contracts are important during mergers and
acquisitions.

By including justice as a moderator, this study continues the research

stream on justice during mergers and acquisitions (Hubbard & Purcell, 2001; Searle &
Ball, 2004; Tumley & Feldman,

1998).

Additionally, employee performance,

organizational deviance, and organizational citizenship behaviors are examined, which
are psychological contract breach outcomes that had yet to be studied with respect to
mergers and acquisitions.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Incomplete Contracts
“The concept o f the contract is one o f the most powerful and pervasive ideas
through which economic and political theorists have tried to understand our society”
(Mackintosh 1993, 135). According to Coase (1937), a contract should only contain the
limits o f one party, but forecasting a party’s responsibilities over a longer contract period
is difficult. A contract is incomplete if “it contains gaps or missing provisions; ...the
contract will specify some actions the party must take but not others; it will mention what
should happen in some states o f the world but not in others” (Hart 1988, 123). Contracts
are incomplete when the parties are unsure o f what will happen in the future or if it is too
costly to identify future events (Hart and Moore, 1999).
Coase (1937) gives two fundamentals o f the relationship between an employer
and an employee.

The first is that the employee must be rendering services to the

employer or to others on behalf o f the employer.

Another main aspect o f the employer-

employee relationship is that the employer has the right to control how and when an
employee does his or her work. Yet, the majority o f employment contracts are ‘at will’
and may be let go at any time (Hart 1988). This shows that parts o f the employment
contract are frequently ambiguous and incomplete.
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Common examples o f incomplete contracts are those between employers and
employees (Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs 1999; Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2012; Christ
Emett, Summers, and Wood 2012), buyers and suppliers (Baiman and Rajan 2002a;
Baiman and Rajan 2002b), departments (Baldenius, Reichelstein, and Sahay 1999;
Baldenius 2000), firms (Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra, 2006), and contracts for make or
buy decisions (Gietzmann 1996; Fallan 2000).

Gietzmann (1996)
Gietzmann (1996) discusses the traditional make or buy decision faced by motor
vehicle assemblers. However, the decision is not always a dichotomous choice. As the
importance o f flexibility increases, so does non-contracted behavior (Macaulay, 1963).
Gietzmann (1996) examines the role o f accounting governance systems based on trust
and commitment in these non-contracted interactions, such as relationships with
subcontractors.
The incomplete contracting theory assumes that (1) not all future possibilities can
be (affordably) foreseen and contracted upon and (2) that both parties may behave
opportunistically. If a subcontractor has invested in any assets that would not be valuable
outside o f the current relationship, the assembler has an opportunity to renegotiate
previously agreed upon exchange terms to be in their favor, knowing that the
subcontractor is stuck. This could lead to a hold-up problem because the subcontractor
would be wary to invest again in assets that are unique to the current relationship. In
order to maintain a good reputation among subcontractors, assemblers should not change
subcontractors very often. With this knowledge, the current subcontractor has the chance
to be opportunistic and the assembler faces an inverted hold-up problem. Social norms,
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customs, and reputations become vital to making these non-contracted relationships
successful (Gietzmann, 1996).
Gietzmann's (1996) main argument is that the traditional make or buy decision
suffers from unnecessary restrictions. In general, the price o f a standard, ‘off the sh elf
unit is used in the decision-making process.

This provides little incentive for

subcontractors to work closely with assemblers to develop customized units.

As an

example o f a different approach, Gietzmann (1996) takes a closer look at Japanese
assemblers, who do form close relationships with their subcontractors. Asanuma (1985,
1989) theorizes that Japanese assemblers are encouraged to have close relationships with
subcontractors, whereas the incomplete contracting theory assumes subcontractors’
investments in relationship-specific assets is the basis o f the relationship.

Asanuma

(1989) also discusses a tournament procedure, where subcontractors are ranked on their
involvement in the design o f the subcomponents (off the shelf, design approved, or
design supplied).
The sample consists o f a Japanese assembler’s first tier subcontractors at a
European site.

The subcontractors were given a survey to complete to see how the

Europeans react to the Japanese practices. The sample size was small. 27 subcontractors
received the survey and the response rate was 67%, resulting in a final sample o f 18
participants. The sample size was small because the assembler recently moved the site to
Europe and was still increasing in size and also because having a small number o f first
tier subcontractors is a feature unique to Japanese supply management.
It was hypothesized and found that relationships are long-term, at least two years.
The subjects indicated that the tournament procedures can be used as a motivational
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technique, and that the subcontractors desire a promotion.

The contracts are in an

obligational form, with a high level o f information sharing. The subcontractors trusted
the assembler to issue further orders, and the subcontractors made relational specific
investments.

Falk, Gdchter, & Kovacs (1999)
Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs (1999) note that most employment contracts are
incomplete, leaving many duties unspecified for the employer and the employee.

In

general, employment contracts have a fixed salary, but performance incentives and work
effort are ambiguous.

Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs (1999) discuss three features o f

employment contracts.

The first feature is reciprocity, defined as “the non-strategic

conditional willingness to reward kind acts (positive reciprocity) and to punish unkind
ones (negative reciprocity) even if this is costly for the reciprocating subject” (Falk,
Gachter, and Kovacs 1999, 254). Reciprocity is an intrinsic motivation for people who
display this willingness without extrinsic incentives. Intrinsic motivations are “followed
for their own sake” and extrinsic incentives are “provided only by the environment and
the nature of interaction” (Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs 1999, 256). Another feature of
employment contracts is that they are long-term, involving repeated interactions.
Reciprocity is generally valued by employers and may be rewarded with a higher salary.
A higher salary serves as an extrinsic incentive for people to behave reciprocally in
repeated interactions, even if they are not intrinsically motived by reciprocity.

Social

interactions are the last feature o f employment relations. These social interactions may
result in social approval or disapproval, which is another extrinsic incentive.
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A laboratory experiment was chosen in order to manipulate intrinsic motivations
and extrinsic incentives.

The sample consists o f 126 students from a university in

Hungary, who were from different fields, and did not know each other. This resulted in
63 randomly matched pairs o f “workers” and “firms”. The game used was the giftexchange game. The firm offers the worker a wage and the worker accepts or rejects it.
A rejection results in zero profit for the firm and an unemployment benefit o f 20 for the
worker. If the worker accepts the offered wage, then the worker picks an effort level. A
higher effort level results in a higher cost. This experiment represents an incomplete
contract setting since the level o f effort is chosen by the worker, not specified by the firm.
Four treatments are utilized in this experiment. The “Stranger” treatment is the
control treatment, where the effects o f reciprocity are isolated. Participants play a series
o f ten anonymous, one-shot games. The subjects in the other three treatments played
repeated games (ten rounds) and kept the same opponent for the duration o f the
experiment.

The “Partner” treatment was used to control for the effects o f repeated

interactions. In the “Approval: Face-to-Face” treatment, participants were introduced to
their opponent before the game, but they did not communicate verbally or with written
comments.

The “Approval: Social Pressure” group were allowed only nonverbal

communication during the game. This group was instructed that there would be a
discussion about the experiment after the session. Both the “Approval: Face-to-Face”
and “Approval: Social Pressure” groups were used to determine the effects o f social
exchange.
The Repeated Interaction Hypothesis, which involves a comparison o f the
“Stranger” and “Partner” treatment groups, predicts that (i) “for a given wage, the
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average effort level is at least as high as in the Stranger-treatment” and (ii) “average wage
and effort levels approach the levels o f the Stranger-treatment by the last period” (Falk,
Gachter, and Kovacs 1999, 265).

The Approval Hypothesis requires a comparison

between the Partner-treatment and the Approval-treatments. It posits that (i) “for a given
wage, effort levels are at least as high as the Partner-treatment” and (ii) “in the Social
Pressure treatment, for a given wage, effort levels are at least as high as in the Face-toFace treatment” (Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs 1999, 266).

The findings reveal that

reciprocal behavior was similar across treatments, and that repeated interactions did
increase effort levels, while social approval did not.

The results demonstrate the

importance o f the intrinsic motivation o f reciprocity, and that the extrinsic incentives o f
repeated interactions and social approval were o f lesser importance in this experiment.

Fallan (2000)
Fallan (2000) studies the make-or-buy decision o f accounting services, whether to
use an external accounting firm or have an internal accounting department. The costs o f
each option, production costs for the make decision and governance costs for the buy
decision, are compared. To save on contracting expenses, only the general guidelines o f
relationships between the buyer and the seller are established, resulting in an incomplete
contract.
A transaction cost economics approach can be used to study production and
governance costs.

There are three dimensions o f transaction cost economics (TCE):

uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity (Williamson 1981). Uncertainty is defined
as “the inability o f decision makers to specify a complete decision tree” (Fallan 2000,
57). Fallan's (2000) main argument is that trust between the buyer and supplier is a way
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to mitigate any fears o f uncertainty that may form in an incomplete contracting setting.
Fallan (2000) replaces the dimension o f uncertainty with trust. Frequency refers to how
often the transaction occurs, and asset specificity is “the degree to which transactionspecific investments in physical and/or in human assets are involved” (Fallan 2000, 60).
When trust is low, it is hypothesized that the make decision will be a better
choice.

As trust increases, so will the likelihood o f a buy decision.

It is also

hypothesized that the less (more) frequent the transactions, the less (more) likely a buy
(make) decision will be made. The physical assets necessary for accounting services,
such as computers and software, are not as specific o f investments as the human
investment.

If a firm’s accounting system is complex, the human investment o f

specialized knowledge is more specific to the current relationship.

Therefore, it is

predicted that higher asset specificity increases the chance o f a make decision.
The unit o f analysis used to examine the make-or-buy decision is the transaction
itself (Williamson 1985). This study also includes the relation as a unit o f analysis. The
transaction is the keeping o f a firm’s accounts and the relation is the relationship between
the buyer and the seller.

Norwegian firms were used for the sample, and data was

collected from tax forms. Surveys were mailed to the owner or the treasurer o f the firm.
The response rate was 46%, and the final sample size was 137 responses.
If the firm kept their accounts, the response was coded as 0, and if an external
accounting firm was used, the response was coded as 1. To measure perceived trust,
respondents were asked “To what extent does the firm trust the quality o f accounting
services which the firm is buying or may buy from an external accountancy firm”.
Frequency was measured by the sales o f the firm. Norwegian law offers seven complex
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tax planning instruments, which are not used by many firms.

The use o f these

instruments was used to measure asset specificity. Individual instruments were coded as
zero if they were not used and one if they were. Logistic regression was utilized in this
study. The classification accuracy rate was 78.6%, with most o f the classification power
coming from trust and frequency. The predicted positive relationships between trust and
a buy decision was supported, as was the positive relationship between frequency and a
make decision. No significance was found for the relationship between asset specificity
and the make-or-buy decision.

Christ, Sedatole, & Towry (2012)
A complete contract “fully specifies the obligations o f the principal to provide
monetary rewards to the agent for each potential performance outcome” (Christ,
Sedatole, and Towry 2012, 1914). Since all obligations are identified, trust does not have
a role between the principal and agent (Al-Najjar & Casadesus-Masanell, 2001).

In

actuality, most principal-agent contracts are incomplete (Luft, 1994). Trust has a more
significant role when a contract is incomplete and there is discretion over monetary
rewards.
The main research question asked by Christ, Sedatole, and Towry (2012) is
whether the framing o f the contract affects the level o f trust the agent has in the principal.
A negatively framed penalty contract may send the message that the principal questions
the agent’s integrity and competence, which leads the agent to trust the principal less
(Das & Teng, 2001), while a positively framed bonus contract does not signal doubt in
the agent’s honesty and abilities. Prior research has found that trust has a reciprocity
effect. When one party perceives mistrust from another party, they are more likely to feel
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mistrust in response (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). If an agent mistrusts the principal, then
he or she may question whether effort will be appropriately rewarded by the principal.
The main hypothesis states that “in an incomplete contract setting, agent effort on tasks
not governed by the incentive contract will be greater under a bonus contract as compared
to a penalty contract” (Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2012, 1919).
A computer-based experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis.

Christ,

Sedatole, and Towry (2012) use an incomplete contracting setting, where the payment for
one task was performance-based and the payment for the second task was left up to the
principal.

The sample was 220 graduate and undergraduate students in accounting

classes, and the subjects were randomly assigned the role o f principal or agent. A 2x2x1
set up was used. The first variable, contract frame, was either a bonus or a penalty. The
second variable, contract implementation, was the principal’s decision to use the
incentive contract or not. This variable was measured, not manipulated, and only the
conditions with use o f the incentive contract were analyzed. The plus one was a control
group with a fixed wage.
The agent was asked to choose a portfolio o f investments for the principal. The
agent’s effort is operationalized as the cost o f investment, as in prior literature (Fehr,
Kirchsteiger, & Riedl, 1993). The agent chose from two investments, shares in Whistle
or Bell. Whistle shares were more expensive, but had a higher average expected return.
The principal wants the higher return from the Whistle shares, while the agent prefers the
Bell shares since they are paying for the investment. In the bonus contract condition,
agents received a bonus if the total returns met or exceeded a return minimum.
Participants in the penalty contract condition were penalized if the returns did not meet
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the minimum. No bonuses or penalties were given in the fixed wage condition. The
subjects were not informed o f their returns until the end o f the experiment. The agents
selected an investment portfolio for the principal twice, once with a formal contract and
once with a contract that with incomplete with regards to the payoff. In the second task,
the agent made another investment. Only Horn shares were available for this additional
investment. The return on the shares was known, and the agent chose to purchase zero to
fifty shares. The number o f shares chosen was the measure o f costly agent effort. The
principal was then made aware o f the number o f Horn shares the agent purchased and
chose how much o f the return to pay the agent.
The findings revealed that the main hypothesis was supported; agent effort was
higher under a bonus contract than a penalty contract. It was also found that subjects felt
more intrusion and less autonomy with a penalty contract, and perceived trust in the
principal decreased when the agent’s integrity was questioned. Finally, it was found that
trust was reciprocal, as expected.

Christ, Emett, Summers, & Wood (2012)
The main objective o f this study is to examine the effects o f two types o f formal
controls on employee performance and motivation. Christ, Emett, Summer, and Wood
(2012) use an incomplete contract setting, because that is similar to the real world
(Williamson 1985; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan 1997). The two types o f formal controls
are preventive and detective.

According to Romney and Steinbart (2009), preventive

controls “deter problems before they arise, while detective controls “discover problems
after they occur” (Christ et al. 2012, 432).

Preventive controls constrain employees’

autonomy, since they restrict their actions, and give immediate feedback.

Detective
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controls do not restrict the employees’ actions, and give immediate or delayed feedback
(Christ, Sedatole, Towry, and Thomas 2008). The formal controls are expected to bring
attention to the controlled task, and result in better employee performance. Research in
motivation has found that employees have difficulty focusing on more than one goal at
the same time (Lindenberg, 2001).

With the use o f formal controls that bring the

employees’ attention to a certain task, it is expected that performance on other tasks tends
to suffer.
It is hypothesized that employees will perform the best (worst) on the controlled
(compensated) dimension o f a task when a preventative control is in place, followed by a
detective control with immediate feedback, then a detective control with delayed
feedback, and finally when no controls are imposed. Christ et al. (2012) also hypothesize
that preventative controls have a negative impact on intrinsic motivation more so than
detective controls with immediate feedback, detective controls with delayed feedback,
and when no controls are used.
The participants o f the experiment consisted o f 131 graduate and undergraduate
business students. The justification for using students as the sample in this experiment is
that students do perform this kind o f task in the “real world” and age and experience are
not expected to matter for this task. The participants were asked to complete a data entry
task as quickly and as accurately as they could for the pretest. They were informed that
their compensation was based on their data entry speed. The payoffs ranged from $5 to
$15, and the average expected payoff was $10. All subjects completed the same pretest
and no controls were used. Afterwards, they were given directions for the second task.
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A 1x4 experimental design was employed for this study.

The four treatment

groups were (1) a condition with no controls, (2) the preventative control condition, (3)
the detective control with immediate feedback condition, and (4) the detective control
with delayed feedback condition. The second task was the same as the pretest in the
condition with no controls. In the preventative control condition, controls were placed on
some characters so that if participants if incorrectly entered a character, the incorrect
character would turn red, and they were unable to move on until they typed in the correct
character.

In the detective control with immediate feedback condition, incorrectly

entered characters would turn red, and subjects were unable to go back and correctly
enter the character.

For the detective control with delayed feedback condition,

incorrectly entered characters would turn red after all o f the characters on that page were
entered, and the participants were not able to make any corrections.

Subjects were

measured on data entry speed to proxy for performance on the compensated dimension o f
the task, and data entry accuracy was measured to proxy for performance on the
controlled dimension.

The controlled dimension simulates an incomplete contract

condition, while the compensated dimension represents a complete contract setting.
Although descriptive statistics show the predicted order o f performance on the
controlled dimension, the only significant difference is between the detective control
conditions. Performance is significantly higher with detective controls and immediate
feedback than detective controls with delayed feedback, suggesting that the timing o f
feedback has the most influence on performance. Descriptive statistics did not show the
predicted order o f performance on the compensated dimension, and none o f the
differences were significant. The subjects in the preventative control condition had less
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intrinsic motivation than in the other conditions, as hypothesized.

The preventative

control condition differs from the others in that it constrains employees’ autonomy,
indicating that restricting autonomy negatively affects intrinsic motivation.

Summary
Most contracts are incomplete to some degree. This is because it can be very
costly to contract for all future events or it may even be impossible (Hart and Moore
1999). Common examples o f incomplete contracts are between buyers and suppliers for
make or buy decisions (Fallan, 2000; Gietzmann, 1996) and those between employers
and employees (Christ, Emett, et al., 2012; Christ, Sedatole, et al., 2012; Falk et al.,
1999).
Factors that affect incomplete make-or-buy contracts are the accounting
governance system (Gietzmann, 1996) and the costs (Fallan, 2000). It is important to
consider the accounting governance system so that it is designed to allow for
relationships based on trust and commitment to develop between subcontractors, for
example. The costs associated with governance and the product costs should be given
due consideration, such as trust, frequency o f transactions, and asset specificity.
The employer-employee relationship is affected by performance incentives
including reciprocity, repeated interactions, and social interactions (Falk et al., 1999).
Also, the framing o f the contract influences trust between the principal and agent (Christ,
Sedatole, et al., 2012).

Finally, formal controls impact motivation and employee

performance (Christ, Emett, et al., 2012). Though not all parts o f a job are contracted,
employees still have expectations o f what will happen.
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These studies show some o f the effects o f incomplete contracts. The variety o f
the studies demonstrates the wide applicability o f incomplete contract situations. The
current study extends the literature on incomplete employment contracts by examining
the effects in a merger or acquisition setting.

Psychological Contracts
When an employee’s contract is incomplete, psychological contracts often
emerge. A psychological contract involves an “individual's beliefs regarding the terms
and conditions o f a reciprocal exchange agreement between that focal person and another
party” (Rousseau 1989, 123).

The basic concept behind psychological contracts is

explained by the Social Exchange Theory. The Social Exchange Theory encompasses a
sequence o f interactions that creates obligations (Blau, 1964). The general rules for the
social exchange are the reciprocity rule, which states that there will be some form o f
repayment, and the negotiation rule, which allows for negotiation o f terms that will
benefit both parties (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). A psychological contract is formed
when an individual perceives that his or her efforts create an obligation o f reciprocity
from the other party. Individuals will have a stronger perception o f an obligation if the
promise is made before they make their contribution. It is this sequence that makes the
promise contractual.

The other party may or may not be aware that a promise has been

perceived to have been made.

In short, there must be a belief in a promise by the

employee, an anticipatory contribution made by the employee, and a perceived future
obligation on the part o f the organization to provide benefits to the employee (Rousseau,
1989).
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Psychological contracts fall on a continuum. The psychological contracts that are
transactional in nature fall at one end o f the continuum, and the psychological contracts
that are relational in nature fall at the other end. However, transactional and relational
psychological contracts are not mutually exclusive.

The absence o f a transactional

contract does not necessarily indicate a relational contract.

The contracts may be

monetarily based and/or they may be based on socio-emotional elements.

Transactional

psychological contracts are “specific, short-term, and monetizable obligations entailing
limited involvement of the parties” (Morrison and Robinson 1997, 229). In contrast, a
psychological contract is considered relational when it “entails broad, open-ended, and
long-term obligations” (Morrison and Robinson 1997, 229). The type o f psychological
contract may affect the likelihood o f an employee perceiving a contract exists or that one
has been broken.
A perceived breach in psychological contract occurs when there is a perception
that a promised obligation is not fulfilled in proportion to one’s contributions. There are
two factors that may lead to a perceived breach in contract. The first is reneging, which
is when the other party is aware that a psychological contract exists but does not follow
through with the obligation.

The other party may be unwilling or unable to follow

through with the obligation.

The second factor is incongruence, which is when the

perceptions about a promise are different between the two parties. The second party may
not even be aware that a promise was perceived. In fact, a real breach may or may not
have actually occurred. As such, a perceived breach in contract is very subjective in
nature. The accounting literature is somewhat limited in its applications o f psychological
contracts, despite their frequency.
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Smith (1993)
Management accounting focuses on reducing costs and increasing efficiency and
according to Smith

“by training, a management accountant is concerned with cost

reduction and efficiency”(1993, 48). Many times managers do not consider how their
words and actions may be perceived by an individual.

This may result in a

misconception by the employee, and it is hard for managers to regain the trust that was
lost. Managers need an information system and should be approachable and make time
for employees so they can communicate individual circumstances. There are times when
employees may be dealing with issues outside o f the workplace that impact their
performance, and allowances may be appropriate and necessary. Although the employer
expects effort from the employee, they may not understand the give and take necessary to
elicit that effort. Smith’s purpose is to bring attention to the existence o f a psychological
contract between the employer and the employee, where the employee puts forth effort
with the expectation that the employer provides support in exchange (1993). He also
conjectures that giving attention to the human element is beneficial for the organization
in the long-run.

Martin (1995)
The economic environment o f increased competition, downsizing, restructuring,
and other organizational changes has threatened job security.

This increases the

importance o f the performance appraisal. Employees are concerned about fairness and
the effect on their pay and promotion opportunities.

Martin (1995) states the

psychological contract has become outdated and been lost. The psychological contract he
is referring to is the unofficial understanding that if employees work hard, they will
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receive pay raises and promotions and generally be taken care o f by the firm. Due to the
rapidly changing environment, redundancy is more common. Though not tested in this
article, Martin (1995) suggests a solution, that the new psychological contract should be
an unofficial agreement that effort is put forth in exchange for long-term employability,
either within the firm or with a different firm. He also advises that the employer can
increase employability by providing training and experience, and that this is an updated
way for companies to provide job security in exchange for the employees’ hard work.

Schofield (1996)
Employees used to give their loyalty and effort in exchange for the employer
providing security and career development. This psychological contract has been broken
due to all o f the changes in the workplace. The Harris Research Centre for the Institute
of Personnel and Development and Templeton College in Oxford identified common
changes including the introduction o f new technology, new working practices,
restructuring, redundancies, and takeovers and mergers. Rather than expecting a life-long
job, employees today should prepare for lifelong employability. Unfortunately, much o f
the training provided for employees is focused on the needs o f that organization.

A

report by the Institute o f Employment Studies suggested elements o f new psychological
contracts. Employers should seek strong identification to the business goals, flexibility to
switch to new tasks, ability and willingness to retrain, and the ability to find another job
should the need arise. Employees should seek career development, a choice in job roles
and work/life balance, the ability to plan for financial security, information about job
options, and real negotiation processes. This will help both parties meet their needs from
the employment relationship.
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Morrison and Robinson (1997)
Morrison and Robinson (1997) define feelings o f violation as “an affective and
emotional experience o f disappointment, frustration, anger, and resentment that may
emanate from an employee’s interpretation o f a contract breach and its accompanying
circumstances.” The severity o f the violation depends on the perceived extent o f the
psychological contract breach. The reason for the breach and the fairness with which an
employee is treated also contribute to the development o f feelings o f violation.

The

authors use theory to argue that employees are more likely to perceive a transactional
psychological contract breach since reciprocity expectations are more direct and
immediate than with relational psychological contracts. Additionally, the authors posit
that, according to theory, when relational breaches are perceived, the feelings o f violation
will be stronger. This is because a breach in a relational contract is in such contrast with
the social contract (Morrison and Robinson 1997).

Mac Rory (1999)
Mac Rory states “In previous years our [Ireland’s] unemployment level was
amongst the highest in Europe” (1999, 28). When unemployment was high, companies
did not have to focus as much on retention. Now that the unemployment rate is lower,
retention is much more important. The old psychological contract was an exchange of
loyalty between the employer and employee.

Today, the psychological contract is an

exchange o f employee commitment for a challenging, interesting job and employability.
If employees actually want to work, they are not only more committed, but more
motivated, productive, and innovative. This benefits the employee and the organization.
After all, the competitive advantage o f a business is in its people.
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Bruce (2001)
Many

employees

have

experienced

organizational

changes

such

as

reorganizations, mergers, demergers, and rationalizations and their psychological
contracts have been broken.

Not many organizations pay sufficient attention to

psychological contracts, even though they are important.

Bruce (2001) refers to

transactional contracts as the rules and relational contracts as emotional attachment. The
relational contract is considered more important because when it is breached, “then
everything starts to unravel” (Bruce 2001, 40). Bruce (2001) explains that employees
may react to a breach with absenteeism or acts o f sabotage towards the company, and
employees will then renegotiate their psychological contract. He also predicts that these
problems are worse if the company experiences a difficult merger, though none o f these
conjectures were tested.

Herrbach (2001)
Herrbach (2001) describes auditing as a double agency relationship. The first
principal-agent relationship is between financial statement users (principals) and the audit
firm (agent), and the second relationship is between the owners o f an audit firm
(principals) and their auditor employees (agents). Herrbach (2001) examines the second
principal-agent relationship by studying the effect o f audit seniors’ behavior on audit
quality. More specifically, he focuses on senior auditors’ quality reducing behaviors.
An audit quality reduction is defined as “poor execution o f an audit procedure that
reduces the level o f evidence gathered for the audit, so that the collected evidence is
unreliable, false or inadequate quantitatively or qualitatively” (Herrbach 2001, 790).
Audit quality reduction behaviors used in the study are (1) the reduction o f work below
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what would normally be considered reasonable, (2) superficial review o f client
documents, (3) acceptance o f weak client explanations, (4) failure to research an
accounting principle, (5) failure to pursue a questionable item, and (6) false sign-off.
Quality reducing behaviors that are indirectly linked to audit quality are also included.
The following quality reducing behaviors pertain to audit seniors’ role attributes: (1)
supervising a team member inadequately, (2) filling out staff performance appraisals too
rapidly, and (3) putting the audit team under excessive pressure.

Non-professional

quality reducing behaviors are (1) Looking for another job in front o f the audit team, (2)
gossiping about the firm, (3) casting doubt on the firm’s methods in the presence o f the
audit team, and (4) casting doubt on the effectiveness o f an audit.
The relationship between an audit firm and an auditor meets the definition o f a
psychological contract. The auditors perform their jobs, and the audit firm compensates
them in various ways.

Herrbach (2001) studies the effect o f psychological contract

breach on quality reducing behaviors.

He uses the following elements o f the

psychological contract: job security, a high salary, performance-based pay, interesting
work, an international experience, career opportunities within the firm, career
opportunities outside the firm, quality professional training, work autonomy, and an
enjoyable human environment.

Affective commitment is included as an independent

variable in addition to the psychological contract. Based on prior literature, perception o f
the firm’s quality control and the frequency o f underreported time are independent,
contextual variables analyzed in this study. The individual quality reducing behaviors are
combined into three dependent variables by category (audit quality reduction, team
mismanagement, and non-professional behaviors). A questionnaire was mailed to 395
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French audit seniors who work in one o f the Big Five international audit firms or two
large French firms, with a response rate o f 43% (170). In order to increase the reliability
o f self-reported responses, the design o f the survey guaranteed anonymity o f the
respondents. Herrbach (2001) also surveyed former audit seniors and those results are
highly similar to those presented in the paper.
O f the ten elements o f the psychological contract, work autonomy, professional
training, and enjoyable human environment are significantly and negatively related to
audit quality reduction behaviors.

When the psychological contract elements o f work

autonomy, professional training, and enjoyable human environment are not fulfilled, the
audit quality may suffer through increased audit quality reducing behaviors. The results
are similar for non-professional and team mismanagement behaviors, although interesting
work is positively related to team mismanagement behaviors.

The results show that

affective commitment is negatively and significantly related to non-professional
behaviors, but not audit quality reducing behaviors. Auditors who are less affectively
committed do not exhibit more audit quality reducing behaviors than others, though they
do engage in nonprofessional behaviors more so than auditors with higher affective
commitment.

Cheng, Schulz, Luckett, and Booth (2003)
The escalation o f commitment phenomenon describes the situation where
decision makers continue uneconomic projects, even if they have information about poor
past performance or more profitable opportunities.

De-escalation strategies attempt to

reduce escalation o f commitment, such as project hurdle rates. Project hurdle rates, or
minimum rate o f return targets, serve as benchmarks that managers can use to determine
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if a particular project is economically beneficial to their organization. The hurdle rate
can be set by an organization and serve as a standardized assessment for projects. The
hurdle rate can also be self-set by the manager making investment decisions.

In this

situation, the psychological contract is with one’s self. Cheng et al. (2003) describe the
self-set hurdle as a psychological contract between the self-set hurdle rate and the
manager; the manager expects that if the hurdle rate is met, the project will be
economically successful.
Cheng et al. (2003) hypothesize that the level o f escalation o f commitment will be
lower for managers with organization-set hurdle rates (and self-set hurdle rates) than
those without formal hurdle rates. They posit that the level o f escalation o f commitment
will be lower for managers with self-set hurdle rates than for the managers with
organization-set hurdle rates.

A 1x3 research design is employed in a laboratory

experiment. The three treatments are no hurdle rate, organization-set hurdle rate, and
self-set hurdle rate. The dependent variable is the tendency to continue an uneconomic
project.

For the experiment, the subjects were asked to assume they were a project

manager at a firm. The hurdle rates were considered non-binding in both the self-set and
organization-set treatment groups. These two treatment groups were given a scenario in
which the project’s return had fallen below the hurdle rate and a more profitable project
was available. All subjects were required to decide whether to continue or terminate the
current project.
This decision was used to measure the tendency to continue an uneconomic
project on a 10-point scale. The initial commitment level was manipulated by informing
the participants o f the following information. As a manager, they were responsible for
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the performance o f the project and their decision was announced in a newsletter. This
was a key project for them, plus they showed their commitment to the project by
promoting it to colleagues. Managers in the company were considered very talented if
they managed their projects successfully, but their reputation would be harmed if they did
not act as if they were committed to the project. O f the 205 Australian undergraduate
students who participated in the experiment, only 186 o f them passed the manipulation
check.
ANOVA was used to calculate the overall mean o f the level o f escalation for each
treatment group. The results showed that although the level o f escalation o f commitment
was lower for the organization-set hurdle rate treatment group than the no hurdle rate
treatment group, the difference was not statistically significant. However, the escalation
commitment level o f the self-set hurdle group treatment was significantly lower than the
no hurdle group treatment. The psychological contract provided a commitment to the
hurdle rate, not the project. As hypothesized, the level o f escalation o f commitment was
lower for the self-set hurdle rate treatment group than the group with the organization-set
hurdle rate.

These results demonstrate the importance o f the psychological contract

formed with the self-set hurdle rate.

Classe (2004)
During mergers and acquisitions, the human aspect o f change is frequently
overlooked. According to consultants, not paying attention to the human aspect in the
early part o f an organizational change is why mergers and acquisitions often do not meet
shareholder expectations. The relationship between employer and employee is important
as most employees have perceived a psychological contract with their employer. In a

30
company, psychological contracts are likely to be mostly transactional or mostly
relational. Organizational changes may be perceived as a breach o f the psychological
contract, and employees may feel less committed to the post-change organization. This
can be very harmful to a company’s bottom line.

“When it comes to mergers and

acquisitions, the nature o f the psychological contract - and whether it is breached during
the change - can make the difference between success and failure” Valerie Garrow told
the Chartered Institute o f Personnel Development’s...annual ‘Psychology at work’
conference in December 2004” (Classe 2004, 32).

Hayes and Schaefer (2005)
Hayes and Schaefer (2005) study a specific type o f psychological contract, the
relational contract, analytically.

To evaluate a manager’s performance, all available

information should be used. Therefore, a manager’s bonus may be based on information
that is not available to all market participants. Hayes and Schaefer (2005) use the term
market participants to refer to non-insider shareholders and non-shareholder insiders.
One issue is that market participants might infer non-public information based on the size
o f a bonus. Another issue is that non-public information is non-verifiable. In this case,
firms depend on relational contracts to enforce bonus payments based on non-public
information. Relational contracts are governed by the company’s reputation, so it is not
necessary for the information to be verifiable or public.
The first scenario considered is where the payments to the manager might provide
information to the public. The manager’s bonus is dependent on the success or failure of
the firm’s project. Under the first-best contract, managers receive their salary after the
contract is agreed upon and the bonus is received when the project is successful. Another
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scenario that is described is the second-best incentive contract when the project’s
outcome is publicly observable.

This contract maximizes the firm’s profits, while

satisfying the manager’s individual rationality constraint.

The manager exhibits more

effort and takes on more risk as the amount o f the bonus increases, so the salary must also
be increased to compensate.
Incentive contracts are analyzed in the case when the board and the manager are
able to observe the project’s outcome before market participants. The timeline begins
with the board offering a contract to the manager. When the contract is accepted by the
manager, the manger receives a salary and chooses his level o f effort. Later the outcome
of the project is observed by the insiders and if the project was successful, the manager
receives a bonus. After market participants observe the bonus payment, there is a round
o f trading. Then the returns from the project are made public, the firm is liquidated, and
the ‘terminal’ value is realized. The terminal value is not a reflection o f the actual returns
from the project. Three types o f equilibrium contracts are described. Efficient separating
contracts have a “one-to-one mapping from project outcomes to bonus payments and
second-best effort and risk sharing”, inefficient separating contracts have a “one-to-one
mapping from outcomes to bonuses, but induce higher effort and place more risk on the
manager, compared to the second-best contract”, and pooling contracts “do not depend on
the project outcom e...no output-contingent bonuses are paid” (Hayes and Schaefer 2005,
438).
It is assumed that the board selects contract and bonus amounts to maximize the
weighted average of the firms’ short-term market value (weight=£) and its terminal value
(weight= k-\). The variable k represents a firm’s myopia. A myopic firm values high
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short-run share prices. A firm that values high short-term share prices may wish to pay a
bonus to give the appearance o f a successful project. Equilibrium contracts have a no
mimic constraint, meaning that the firms with unsuccessful projects will not give a bonus.
In this case, the short-term and terminal values are equal. The equilibrium contract for
firms that place a low weight on k is an efficient separating contract. When the value o f k
is higher, the equilibrium contract will be the high-profit contract that satisfies no-mimic
and individual rationality constraints or the pooling contract. If the value o f k is even
higher, the equilibrium contract is a pooling contract because a separating contract is too
costly. The more myopic a firm is, the more the manager must be compensated for the
additional risk and cost assumed, thereby lowering a firm’s profits.
The next model considered is one in which the firm does not have an incentive to
increase short-term share prices, and relies solely on their reputation to enforce the
contract. These relational incentive contracts are analyzed in a repeated-game setting.
An impatient firm is a firm that seeks to shift the cash flows from the future (project
returns) to the present (not giving a bonus).

If the firm breaches the relational

psychological contract by not paying a bonus, the manager will no longer trust the firm’s
contract offers.

Since the firm can no longer depend on their reputation as an

enforcement mechanism, the firm can either offer a pooling contract or shut down. This
is referred to as the reputational governance constraint.
In the first model, myopia leads to higher bonus offers and lower profits, while
impatience leads to smaller bonus offers and higher profits in the second model. The
third model examines the interaction o f these two effects: signaling and relational
incentive contracts. This model is the same as the previous one except for the added
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assumption that the board maximizes a weighted average o f short-term and end-of-period
share prices. A firm can deviate from the relational contract in two ways. The first is
that the firm does not pay a bonus when the project was successful, and the second is that
the firm pays a bonus when the project was unsuccessful.

A different governance

mechanism is when the firm has an incentive to pay a big enough bonus to separate itself
from a firm with an unsuccessful project. If the firm pays a bonus when the project was
unsuccessful, the manager assumes that there is no longer a relationship between the
project’s success and the bonus and does not exhibit effort in later periods.

In

equilibrium, attempts to mislead the market are unprofitable. When k is small, the largest
credible bonus may be too small to yield positive profits for the firm because the best
option for the firm is to shut down if the relational contract was breached. On the other
hand, when k is very large, the credible bonus might be too big to yield positive profits
for the firm since the firm would rather offer a pooling contract or shut down.

For

intermediate values o f k, the credible bonus results in non-negative firm profits because a
reputational bonus is feasible.

The main finding is that the relationship between

equilibrium bonus amounts (and therefore profits) and the level o f the firm’s myopia, k, is
non-monotonic.

D u ff and Monk (2006)
Duff and Monk (2006) consider the psychological contract held by newly hired
faculty members o f accounting and finance departments in higher education in the UK
and Ireland. The motivations for becoming a lecturer and the sources o f occupational
discontent are examined in this study. Occupational discontent, dissatisfaction with one’s
job, represents a breach in the psychological contract.

34
The sample consists o f three cohorts. The three cohorts included appointments
made January 1998 to December 1999, January 2000 to December 2001, and January
2002 to December 2003. The response rate o f a questionnaire sent to the individuals
identified in the cohorts was 37.4% for cohort 1, 43% for cohort 2, and 51.4% for cohort
3. Exploratory factor analysis was used to analyze the questionnaire items relating to the
motivations for becoming a lecturer, sources o f occupational discontent, and ways the
career could be improved.

Cluster analysis was utilized to examine variations in the

sample.
The EFA identified four factors that motivate people to become accounting
academics. In order o f highest to lowest level o f importance, they are flexible hours,
work activities (research and scholarly), idealism (developing the profession while being
removed from practice), and material rewards. In descending order o f importance, the
factors identified concerning occupational discontent are job demands (undervalued
effort), rewards and working conditions (salary, promotions, flexibility in work hours),
sense of detachment (separation from the profession), and poor facilities. The sources o f
occupational discontent are not in line with the motivations for becoming a lecturer. This
indicates that the psychological contract changed over the two years since the lecturers
were hired. The respondents indicated that the following factors would make the career
more attractive: internal recognition, increased time resource, acknowledgement and
working conditions, improved material rewards, and external opportunities. In the openended section of the questionnaire, the subjects indicated that an induction process, a
discussion about teaching, administration, and processes unique to the institution, could
improve the career.
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The cluster analyses revealed four clusters. The first has the fewest sources o f
occupational discontent and the highest proportion o f professional qualified accountants.
The second cluster is the youngest, has the highest proportion o f non-degree holders, and
the highest score on the factors o f occupational discontent. The third cluster scored the
lowest on the factors o f occupational discontent and is the only one to have a majority o f
males. Rewards and working conditions is rated as a source o f occupational discontent in
the fourth cluster, which has the lowest proportion o f professional accounting
qualifications. While variability within the sample exists, demographic information does
not explain the difference in opinions held by the new academics.

Parker, Nouri, and Hayes (2011)
Large accounting firms may have a ‘move up or move out’ philosophy, where an
employee’s future with the firm depends on promotions. The firm’s employees are aware
of this mentality. Employees observe the distributive justice, or the perceived fairness o f
promotion decisions, within their firm. Promotion instrumentality is the belief that if
employees work hard, they will earn a promotion.

This can be considered a

psychological contract because employees perceive the company will reciprocate their
effort with a promotion.
It is hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between distributive justice
and promotion instrumentality.

A psychological contract breach is when employees

perceive that promotion decisions were not based on performance.

As a result,

employees may choose to leave the organization. Promotion instrumentality and turnover
are predicted to have an inverse relationship.

It is also posited that promotion

instrumentality mediates the relationship between distributive justice and turnover.
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Turnover may be affected by the level o f performance.

Employees who are high

performers and are not promoted may choose to leave the company. Parker, Nouri, and
Hayes (2011) predict that the inverse relationship between promotion instrumentality and
turnover is stronger for high performing employees.
performance

on

the

relationship

between

A moderating role o f job

distributive justice

and

turnover

is

hypothesized.
The sample is employees o f large public accounting firms. A survey was sent out
through the firms’ internal mailing. Respondents were given return envelopes to mail
their completed survey to the researchers.

O f the 243 surveys distributed, 116

respondents returned the survey, though six were unusable. This results in a final sample
size o f 110 and an effective response rate o f 45%.

Turnover intentions, distributive

justice, promotion instrumentality, and job performance were all measured with
previously established scales, though the scale for promotion instrumentality was
modified.
The first two hypotheses were measured using OLS regression. OLS regression
was used to test the mediation model o f hypothesis three, and it was also used to test the
moderated model in hypothesis four. The last hypothesis was tested by estimating the
mediation model from hypothesis three and conditioning it on the moderator using OLS
regression. All hypotheses were supported. The moderating role o f job performance on
the relationship between promotion instrumentality and turnover intentions is of
particular interest because firms want to retain their best employees.
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Williams and Adams (2013)
A longitudinal approach was used to qualitatively study corporate annual report
disclosures o f NatWest Bank in the UK from 1980 to 1995. Williams and Adams (2013)
assess whether the disclosures promote transparency and accountability for employees,
who are significant stakeholders in the bank.

Social responsibility is portrayed as

deregulation. Deregulation led to mergers and acquisitions, causing branches to close
and employees to lose jobs. Several key issues were identified including: technology and
branch

rationalization,

redundancies,

staff

training/career

prospects,

mode

of

employment, and staff participation/rewards. Some of these issues affect psychological
contracts held by the employees.
NatWest increasingly used automated payment facilities and new techniques for
cash handling to lower the staff costs o f these tasks (NatWest, 1980). The time that was
previously spent on these activities was now used in sales roles.

Sparrow (1996)

suggested the new, outward facing relationship with the customers was a violation o f the
psychological contract and would cause problems for banks.

The annual report

disclosures failed to include if or how employees’ needs were considered during
decision-making, despite the fact that the decisions would impact the employees.

In

order to reduce costs, there were staff cuts. The annual report disclosures referred to a
fall in staff numbers, rather than staff cuts. (Kets de Vries & Balazs, 1997) suggested
that this was a breach o f the psychological contract where employee effort and loyalty
was exchanged for lifetime employment. The other employee issues were not addressed
thoroughly in the annual report disclosures, either.

Overall, it appears as though the
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disclosures were not influenced by transparency and accountability and the company
does not genuinely care about its employees.

Summary
In summary, the accounting literature has examined various psychological
contracts. Employee effort is exchanged for employer support (Smith, 1993), pay raises
(Martin 1995), promotions (Martin 1995; Parker, Nouri, and Hayes 2011), job security
(Martin 1995; Herrbach 2001; Williams and Adams 2013), and bonuses (Hayes &
Schaefer, 2005). Employee effort is also exchanged for a high salary, performance-based
pay, interesting work, an international experience, career opportunities within the firm,
career opportunities outside the firm, quality professional training, work autonomy, and
an enjoyable human environment (Herrbach, 2001). Similarly, employee commitment is
exchanged for a challenging job and employability (Mac Rory, 1999). One psychological
contract studied is between the employee and a self-set hurdle rate, where the employee
expects his or her investment project to be successful if it meets the self-set hurdle rate
(Cheng et al., 2003).

Schofield (1996) provides recommendations for future

psychological contracts.
Once a psychological contract has been perceived by an employee, there is a
chance that it will be breached. Duff and Monk (2006) identify breaches related to job
demands, rewards and working conditions, sense o f detachment, and poor facilities for
newly hired academics.

During an organizational change, such as a merger,

psychological contracts are often breached (Classe, 2004). Williams and Adams (2013)
reference the changed relationship between the employees and the customers as a
perceived breach o f psychological contract. When psychological contracts are breached,
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it can lead to negative outcomes such as absenteeism and sabotage (Bruce, 2001). This
dissertation extends the literature on psychological contracts by further examining the
effects o f breaches during mergers and acquisitions.

Mergers & Acquisitions
Introduction
Vitale and Laux (2012) note the importance o f researching mergers and
acquisitions, since companies frequently engage in them despite the high failure rates.
Companies merge or acquire in order to achieve growth, improve efficiency, as a defense,
or for “empire building” (Vitale and Laux 2012, 1211).

However, 30% to 50% o f

mergers and acquisitions decrease shareholder value, and 60% to 80% o f them do not add
any shareholder value (Boyle et al., 2012).
Some reasons why mergers and acquisitions fail are “ ...buying for the wrong
reason, selecting the wrong partner, and buying at the wrong tim e...” (i.e. Armenakis
1999; Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999), (Bellou 2007, 70). Another reason for merger
and acquisition failures is that the company is paying too high o f a price (Marks and
Mirvis 2011). It is not uncommon for an acquiring firm to pay more than the identifiable
value o f the target company. An example o f an unidentifiable value is talented managers
(Boyle et al., 2012). “The merger process is not simply about the changes in the balance
sheet. It also has a lasting impact on the employees o f the organizations concerned”
(Lanigan 2007, 54). According to Classe (2004), ignoring the human aspect o f mergers
and acquisitions is why companies do not experience the expected benefits from the
merger and acquisition (M&A).
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“ ...[T]he nature o f the psychological contract, and whether it is breached during
the change, can make the difference between success and failure, Valerie Garrow told the
Chartered

Institute o f Personnel Development’s...annual

‘Psychology

at work’

conference in December 2003” (Classe 2004, 34). Some o f the effects o f psychological
contract breaches during a merger or acquisition are: voluntary turnover (Cortvriend,
2004; Searle & Ball, 2004; Shield et al., 2002; Tumley & Feldman, 1998), turnover
intentions (Cortvriend, 2004; Freese et al., 2011), loyalty (Bligh & Carsten, 2005;
Tumley & Feldman, 1998), job satisfaction (Bligh & Carsten, 2005), and organizational
commitment (Bligh and Carsten 2005; Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2011).

Sparrow (1996a)
During times o f change, it is important to consider human resource strategies
(Hunter, 1995). One strategy is to move towards empowerment and high performance
work systems.

The initial costs are recouped through increased productivity, fewer

mistakes, and strong relationship banking. Lloyds Bank, which went through a merger in
1995, determined that it is seven times more expensive to gain a new customer than to
keep a current one. Another strategy is to sustain costs, quality, and sales by monitoring
performance, offering incentives, and improving technology. Employees understand that
changes in the human resource strategy may result in changes in their employment
relationship, or psychological contract.
Old psychological contracts are those that were formed during times o f stable
employment, while new psychological contracts are developed during times of
continuous change.

The old and new psychological contracts differ in many ways.

Sparrow (1996a) constructed a table o f these differences based on prior literature (Ehrlich
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1994; Kissler 1994; Morrison 1994; Rousseau 1989; Rousseau 1995; Rousseau and
Greller 1994; Sparrow 1996b). That table is recreated in Table 1.

Table 1
Comparison o f Old and New Psychological Contracts
O ld c o n tra c t

R e w a rd s

Stable, short-term focus
Paternalism , tim e-served,
exchange security for
com m itm ent
Paid on level, position and status

M o tiv a tio n a l c u rre n c y

Prom otion

P ro m o tio n bias

Expected, tim e-served, technical
com petency

M o b ility ex p ectatio n s

Infrequent and on em ployee's
term s

R e d u n d a n c y /te n u re g u a ra n te e

Job for life if perform

R esp o n sib ility

Instrum ental em ployees,
exchange prom otion for more
responsibility

S ta tu s

V ery im portant

P e rso n a l d ev e lo p m e n t

T he organization's responsibility

T ru s t

High trust possible

C h a n g e e n v iro n m e n t
C u ltu re

N ew C o n tra c t
C ontinuous change
Those who perform get
rew arded and have contract
developed
Paid on contribution
Job enrichm ent, com petency,
developm ent
Less opportunity, new criteria,
for those w ho deserve it
H orizontal, used to rejuvenate
organization, m anaged process
Lucky to have a jo b , no
guarantees
T o be encouraged, balanced
w ith m ore accountability, linked
to innovation
To be earned by com petence and
credibility
Individual's responsibility to
im prove em ployability
D esirable, but expect em ployees
to be m ore com m itted to project
or profession

Employees who are o f a low grade, have a low length o f service, are young,
and/or are female are expected to have less o f an attachment to the old psychological
contract.

(Sparrow, 1996b) hypothesizes that employees who are steeped in the old

psychological contract, who have been employed longer, and who have a higher
psychological attachment will demonstrate a more negative response to the new
employment relationship.

Length o f service, older age, and higher grade are used to

proxy for employees with a higher psychological attachment to the old contract.
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Prior literature provides four types o f middle management mindsets (Herriot
1995; Herriot, Pemberton, and Hawtin 1996; Holbeche, James, and Wark 1995; Mirvis
and Hall 1994). Flexers “understand the nature o f the business changes and are prepared
to accept sideways moves or flexible working patterns”, while the Ambitious “understand
the implications o f the changes but can still see personal progression for themselves”
(Sparrow 1996a, 78). Lifers “hanker after a guarantee o f security, believe that experience
and length o f service are a legitimate basis o f reward and are unimpressed by
performance-related pay”, and then there are those who are Disengaged “either explicitly
or implicitly, from the organization and have begun to exhibit withdrawal behavior”
(Sparrow 1996a, 78). It is hypothesized that the staff will exhibit differential contracts
that cover these four attitudinal positions. It is believed that if employees feel they have
the best contract available, then they will lower their expectations. The last hypothesis is
that beliefs about the environment placing the cause o f contract degradation and locus of
control beyond the sole responsibility and actions o f the employer will be related to more
positive levels o f commitment and satisfaction.
A UK retail bank that underwent job cuts, experienced changes in the branch
network and HR framework, and was in the process o f a major customer service initiative
is examined by Sparrow (1996a).

During a change program, the bank discussed

psychological contracts with its employees. The bank used focus groups and a sample o f
200 employees to create booklets that summarized the change process. MBA students
then interviewed 45 staff members in order to understand their motivational drivers and
outlooks about the future. The information gathered by the MBA students was used to
create a survey about attitudinal dimensions o f the psychological contract. One hundred
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and seven employees completed the survey, which was a 53.5% response rate. Age,
rank, tenure, and gender were analyzed using t-tests and ANOVA to assess whether there
are four middle management mindsets. To measure the psychological contract, Sparrow
(1996a) used The Experienced Managers Questionnaire, developed by Sundridge Park
Management Centre.

Sparrow (1996a) combined all o f the attitudinal statements and

used principal components analysis to test if employees exhibit the four mindsets. Locus
of control was measured using three items, and was used to analyze the hypothesized
positive relationship between an external locus o f control and commitment and
satisfaction.
Differences in career opportunities, exit requirements, trust, commitment, and
satisfaction among age, service, grade, and sex were examined. Dissimilarities in career
opportunities and exist requirements were found, although these variables were not
related to trust, commitment, or satisfaction.

The results suggest that the expected

differences in age, service, grade, and sex are stereotypical. As predicted, the subjects
exhibit four distinct attitudes.

Nineteen percent o f the sample was classified as

Ambitious, 37% were considered Flexers, 13% were categorized as Lifers, and 31% were
Disengaged. Principal components analysis showed that these groups could be broken
down further, and that there were actually seven distinct groups: frustratedly mobile, still
ambitious, passive flexibility, guidance seeking, buy me outers, just pay me more, and
don’t push me too far. Contrary to expectations, locus o f control was not significantly
related to commitment or satisfaction. A main finding o f this study is that it is unlikely
that communication would change employee attitudes.
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Tumley and Feldman (1998)
Turnley and Feldman (1998) seek to answer the following research questions:
To what extent do managers in restructuring firms feel their psychological contracts have
been violated? What are the specific elements o f psychological contracts that managers
feel have been most seriously violated? What are the outcomes o f psychological contract
violations? What are the situational factors that might mitigate severe negative reactions
to psychological contract violations during restructuring? In order to test these research
questions, Tumley and Feldman (1998) use a sample o f 541 managers and executive
level employees.

The employees are from three different employment sites.

Two

hundred and twenty-three were from a bank that grew through mergers and acquisitions,
105 worked for a state agency that went through a major restructuring and reorganization,
and 213 graduate business school alumni were surveyed. Half o f the alumni have been
through a downsizing or restructuring in the previous two years.
Psychological contract violation is measured using four items from Robinson and
Rousseau (1994) and Guzzo, Noonan, and Elron (1994). Violation was scored on a 5point Likert-type scale. To measure the psychological contract, respondents were asked
to indicate the extent to which sixteen psychological contract elements have been
violated. These elements consisted o f both monetary and nonmonetary items from prior
research (e.g. Rousseau 1990). The degree o f the restructuring was also measured using
questions about whether there were a large number o f layoffs, a major reorganization, or
a merger or acquisition in the last two years. Exit was measured as intention to quit and
actual job search behaviors. Voice, neglect, and loyalty were also measured using scales.
The following five situational variables were examined: procedural justice in the layoff
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process as well as in pay raise and promotion decisions; the likelihood o f future
violations; and the quality o f relationships with supervisors and colleagues. Participants
were asked to rate these situations as low or high.
Though psychological contract violation was measured as a dichotomous variable,
comments from the subjects revealed that there were actually four different outlooks.
There were employees who felt pleased with their psychological contract fulfillment, who
did not think there was a commitment, who indicated their experiences at work were not
as expected, and the largest group indicated their psychological contracts were seriously
violated. Employees were more likely to perceive a violation if they felt the organization
knowingly failed to follow through on commitments or if the commitments were
particularly important. One-way ANOVAS were conducted, and it was found that the
managers who worked in organizations that underwent downsizings, reorganizations, and
mergers and acquisitions were more likely to perceive violations to their psychological
contracts compared to employees who worked for companies that did not undergo any
major changes.
To analyze the elements o f the psychological contract, MANOVA was used.
Results among the employees who had been through different types o f organization
change were generally consistent, so results for downsizing are the ones presented.
Significant violations were found in regards to job security, input into decisions,
opportunities for advancement, health care benefits, and responsibility and power.
Subjects indicated their psychological contracts were somewhat violated in terms o f base
salary, feedback, regularity o f pay raises, supervisor support for work problems, career
development, training, and bonuses for exceptional work. Employees who worked in a
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more stable environment also felt these elements o f their psychological contract were not
being met. Managers felt their employers were fulfilling their commitment to overall
benefits, organizational support for personal problems, job challenge and excitement, and
retirement benefits. The employees who experienced a merger or acquisition were more
likely to perceive a violation in their psychological contract related to job security, input
into decision making, organizational support, and bonuses.
Responses to contract violations were examined. Employees who worked for an
organization that restructured were significantly more likely to intend to quit their job,
engage in actual job search behavior, and have less loyalty. There were no significant
differences in regards to neglect and voice. The effects o f the situational factors on the
dependent variables, overall assessment o f the psychological contract violation, intent to
quit, active job search, voice, commitment, loyalty, and neglect behaviors, were tested
also. For both justice factors and the quality o f working relationships with the supervisor,
all o f the dependent variables had significant differences, except for neglect. Similarly,
all o f the dependent variables were significant for the likelihood o f future psychological
contract violations. For the quality o f working relationships with co-workers, only intent
to search, loyalty, and neglect were significant.

Hubbard & Purcell (2001)
Hubbard and Purcell (2001) use the term acquisition, as opposed to merger, since
merger implies that two equal companies are joining and that is rarely the case. Four
elements of employee expectations are proposed: whether employees have a job/type of
job, re-socialization, how to fit into the new organization, and learning the cultural
behavior. It is suggested that these expectations will be mediated by the process phase of
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the acquisition, the employees’ role, and the extent o f the organizational integration. The
phases o f the acquisition process are strategic planning, formal communication,
implementation, and stabilization. Three roles o f employees are described. ‘Negotiators’
are more senior managers who are involved with the acquisition from the start.
‘Enactors’ are also managers, though they are below the ‘Negotiators’, and they are
responsible for implementation and communication about the acquisition. ‘Recipients’
are employees in non-managerial roles, who do not have input into decisions concerning
the acquisition, but they are affected by the consequences o f these decisions.
Twenty-two interviews were conducted with executives involved with the
acquisition from five companies that experienced an acquisition within the last two years.
The focus was on employees from the acquired companies. After the interview, subjects
were asked to rate their concerns on a scale o f one to five, aiding in the process o f
aggregating opinions. Since the sample size is so small, this is an exploratory study o f
employee expectations. Cases from two o f the five companies are presented.
The first case study took place six months after the acquisition.

The new

managing director told employees that “it is business as usual” (Hubbard & Purcell 2001,
23). Employees found this comment insincere as major changes were implemented with
little notice.

There was no communication about a plan to reduce the number of

managerial employees until the date to do so was set. Around 40% o f regional directors,
20% o f middle operational managers, and the majority o f the regional training staff were
removed (Hubbard & Purcell, 2001).

This day was termed ‘Black Monday’ by the

employees (Hubbard & Purcell, 2001). After the layoffs, lower level Negotiators become
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more concerned about the culture, Enactors become more concerned about the
procedures, and Recipients experienced a decrease in trust.
The second case study was conducted twenty months after the acquisition.
Employees were told that there would not be very many modifications, but major changes
in procedures and culture took place.
according to employees.

Overall, the redundancies were handled fairly,

After the initial concern about job security subsided,

Negotiators focused on their status and the new differences, and later become concerned
about career development.

Enactors were worried about the cultural and procedural

differences and were less pleased with their career development compared to employees
from the acquiring company.
Based on the case studies, seven elements o f expectations are presented. They are
quality o f communication, believability o f information, trust in management action,
credibility o f leadership, fairness o f action, consistency o f action and communication, and
logic o f management action or behavior. Trust and management credibility are based
somewhat on management actions, but “the way in which actions were conducted and
explained to employees appeared to be the most important” (Hubbard & Purcell 2001,
31).

“Acquisitions constitute a likely breach in the psychological contract in a

particularly complex and multi-faceted way”, which may contribute to acquisition failure
(Hubbard and Purcell 2001, 31).

Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson (2002)
National Health Service (NHS) hospitals in Britain have undergone major
organizational changes. In 1990, the Community Care Act was passed, which established
an internal market. The internal market separated those who provide health care from
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those who purchase health care. One trust director formed a Strategy Group, consisting
o f general managers and clinical directors, in 1991.

After analyzing the strengths,

weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, it was determined that the current hospital trust
was too small. This created several incentives for mergers, including market share and
medical service pressures, as well efficiency and effectiveness issues (Brigg, 2001). A
merger was officially authorized eight years later. Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson (2002)
study human resource management and employees’ reactions during the merger and
accompanying changes.
These newly merged hospitals were studied using observation, interviews, and
focus groups. It was noted that the psychological contracts from the first employer had
an effect on the employees’ reaction to the merger and whether they were able to “make
the most o f the merger” (Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson 2002, 361). One hospital did not
successfully manage human resources, and many employees quit after the merger. The
hospitals experienced issues due to differing traditions, loyalties, values, procedures,
culture, poor leadership, uncertainty, and demotivation.

It is recommended that

information should be communicated to employees frequently, specifically information
pertaining to progress and problems.

“In managing change, psychological contracts

should be deliberately, carefully, and extensively preserved” (Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson
2002, 361).

Cortvriend (2004)
The Labour party gained power in the UK in 1997, and the National Health
Service has experienced many organizational changes since then, including mergers and
de-mergers. Though the National Health Service o f Britain has undergone many mergers
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and de-mergers, a gap in the literature exists in this area (Cortvriend, 2004). Research
from the United States and Canada has addressed mergers, and the findings are generally
consistent with those in Britain. The nurse retention literature has noted management
style, lack o f communication, and increased stress as motives for the voluntary turnover
o f nurses (Cangelosi, Markham, & Bounds, 1998; Leveck & Jones, 1996; Martin &
Mackean, 1988).
Cortvriend (2004) was able to gain access to a Primary Care Trust (PCT). The
goal was to examine what the employees felt were the most important parts o f the change
and their psychological contract, as well as their experiences. The specific PCT that was
studied went through a merger, and then went through a de-merger one year later. The
sample consists o f 31 subjects (administrative staff, senior managers, middle managers,
allied health professionals, and nurses) who participated in focus groups. An example
statement was given on a topic in order to begin the discussion. While the employees’
experiences during the organizational changes were varied, the overall feelings toward
the de-merger were much more negative than toward the merger.
An autocratic leadership style led to negative feelings and outcomes, while a
democratic leadership style led to positive feelings and outcomes.

This leads to the

conclusion that leadership style is related to employees’ feelings. Subjects also discussed
culture in terms o f the relationship between the merging organizations, geographical
areas merging, and the conflicts and problems that it caused. During the discussion, the
participants tended to focus on their own role in the changes. When the employees felt
they were not involved in the merger decisions, they felt disempowered.
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Psychological contracts were also discussed in the focus groups.

The subjects

described communication and consultation as practically non-existent during the merger
(Cortvriend, 2004).

The participants discussed job satisfaction in regards to extrinsic

factors, such as pay and working conditions. The policies concerning holidays had not
been addressed. These can be perceived as breaches o f the psychological contract. In
fact, some people in this organization did leave and others, who ultimately stayed,
thought about quitting. Also, motivation levels changed over time for these employees.
The mean tenure o f the subjects was seventeen years. This may mean their psychological
contracts were strong, even without a breach o f contract. The change and possibility o f
further changes left the employees feeling uncertain, resigned, uneasy, anguished,
frustrated, shocked, and/or demotivated (Cortvriend, 2004). This study may have been
limited by the exploratory nature o f the study and the small sample size.

Searle and Ball (2004)
The purpose o f the Searle and Ball (2004) study is to investigate the role o f trust
and distrust for those who remain with an organization after it has gone through a merger.
Differences in trust are thought to relate to the psychological contract and organizational
justice. Verbal commitments and contextual aspects are two mechanisms o f expectations
in a psychological contract (Rousseau, 2001). Rousseau's (2004) mechanisms are used to
determine “how far a leap o f trust will be made” (Searle and Ball 2004, 709). Some
examples o f factors o f psychological contracts are promotion, training, and performance.
Organizational justice, including distributive, procedural, and interactional justice,
is linked to trust (Greenberg, 1987).

Distributive justice is based on the fairness o f

decision outcomes, such as employees being let go from the organization. Procedural
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justice is based on the fairness o f the procedures used to reach a decision. An example is
the fairness o f the procedures used to determine which employees to let go. Interactional
justice is based on the treatment o f the individuals affected by a decision. Interactional
justice has two dimensions, interactional and informational. Interactional justice is the
level o f respect with which people are treated, while informational justice is the level o f
communication or quality o f explanations.
One major difference between trust and distrust is the “enduring quality o f
impact” (Searle and Ball 2004, 711). Distrust can form in two different ways. It can
form as “a consequence o f the absence o f confidence in others” or “through perceived
malice and hostility from others (Govier, 1993)” (Searle and Ball 2004, 711).

When

distrust develops, those left in the organization become information processors and study
others’ motives (Fein & Hilton, 1994; Fein, 1996; Kramer, 1996; Staw, Sutton, &
Kramer, 2001). Gossip pertaining to managers can also affect trust.
Two confectionary manufacturers merged. Longitudinal data was collected from
the time the decision was made to consolidation o f the manufacturers in 2000. Interviews
were conducted in 2000 and again in 2002. In between the interviews, field notes were
taken during visits. Employees were asked questions about their daily work after the
takeover and production changes. At the end o f the two year time period, only six o f the
original participants remained with the organization.

There were subjects from both

manufacturers and three o f them were first tier management and the other three were
shop floor staff. Two o f the participants were promoted in the time between interviews.
The surviving employees indicated that their job-related expectations, or
psychological contract, changed. One important aspect identified by the subjects was the
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new benefits. Trust was based on the specific benefits received. One distrust dimension
was local experience.

Distrust actually increased simply from hearing about other

employees’ experiences. Mistakes were made in the wages and there were delays in the
correction. This was viewed as a lack o f respect, which is a part o f interactional justice,
while the delay in corrections was viewed as procedural injustice.
Organizational justice was the most common theme.

The two main types o f

issues were procedural and interactional justice; 54% o f the trust-related issues pertained
to these two types o f justice. The survivors felt there was a serious lack o f respect shown
toward the remaining employees.
information.

Interactional justice deteriorated through a lack o f

There were procedural justice issues in the consistency, accuracy, and

application o f new human resource processes. The general outcome was distrust. “Once
distrust was established in the minds o f survivors, their attention was focused on
discrepancies, such as broken promises”, or breaches in the psychological contract
(Searle and Ball 2004, 718).

Bligh and Carsten (2005)
Managers who experience organizational changes, such as mergers, have their
own psychological contracts. Findings from prior research suggest that communication,
job security, social support, and work-role stability are important in times o f
organizational change (Guzzo et al., 1994; Marks & Mirvis, 1998; Rousseau, 2001).
However, managers also play a role in their employees’ psychological contracts. The
managers are responsible for sharing information about the changes with their employees.
The purpose o f Bligh and Carsten's (2005) study is to examine psychological contracts
from a manager’s perspective.
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The sample is comprised o f managers from a large healthcare system that went
through a full-scale merger two years before the sample was collected. Bligh and Carsten
(2005) interviewed managers from two departments. The first department, the Cardiac
service line, was in an intermediate stage o f the merger, and the second department, the
OBG/YN service line, was at a later stage in the merger process.

The sixteen nurse

managers (nine from Cardiac, seven from OBG/YN) participated in one to two hour
interviews.

Their responses were coded as transactional or relational psychological

contracts, based on the work o f Guzzo, Noonan, and Elron (1994) and Lester et al.
(2002).

In the pattern-level coding, the transactional and relational categories were

grouped into analytic units and higher-order categories.
Two types o f psychological contracts were discussed during the interviews.
Upward contracts are contracts between the supervisor and top management, and
downward contracts are between the manager and their employees. Three main elements
o f downward contracts emerged. Honest and direct communication is imperative both
during and after the changes. In order to alleviate some o f the uncertainty, managers
gave their employees autonomy and discretion.

The nurse managers also felt it was

important to provide emotional support during the change process.

Respect was

mentioned, although less frequently than the other downward contract themes. The most
frequently discussed upward contract theme was material support and resources, though
managers were also concerned about relational aspects o f their psychological contract.
The other main theme was strategic communication. Managers most wanted to know
information regarding the precise nature, timing, and direction o f the merger process.
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Empowerment was also mentioned in the conversations about downward contractual
elements.
Additional themes that developed throughout the interviews were loyalty and
commitment.

The nurse managers expressed difficulty in giving up old work sites,

routines, and familiar places. Most o f the topics mentioned were relational aspects o f
psychological contracts, although some were transactional in nature. Work schedules and
satisfactory work conditions were included as part o f the downward contracts.

The

frustration o f changing job descriptions was considered part o f the upward contracts. The
managers’ main focus on relational parts o f the psychological contract is consistent with
prior literature (Herriot, Manning, and Kidd 1997). Herriot, Manning, and Kidd (1997)
found that lower level employees tended to place more emphasis on the transactional
aspects o f the psychological contract.
While the conclusions o f the study by Bligh and Carsten (2005) are limited by its
small sample size o f sixteen nurse managers, the findings showed transactional elements
may be more important to managers immediately after a merger. When the contracts are
reestablished, the managers should be able to pay more attention to the relational parts o f
their psychological contracts.

Those who were interviewed expressed that they felt

lonely and did not communicate very often with their peers. It is suggested that support
can be provided even with small gestures such as phone calls, timely inquiries, or tokens
o f appreciation and recognition (Bligh & Carsten, 2005).

Bellou (2007)
Mergers and acquisitions are examples o f extreme organizational change, which
can be threatening to employees (Saunders & Thornhill, 2003). It has been found that
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organizational changes may lead employees to reexamine their psychological contract
(Wiesenfeld & Brocker, 1993).

It has also been found that monitoring employees’

psychological contracts is important to achieve expected outcomes from mergers and
acquisitions (Shield et al., 2002).

Yet, research in this area is limited, particularly

empirical studies. Bellou (2007) focuses on the changes in the psychological contracts
during the merger and acquisition process by comparing the ‘previous’ and the ‘current’
contracts. A ‘previous’ psychological contract “refers to the contract developed between
employees and the pre-merger/acquisition organization (Bellou 2007, 69). Psychological
contracts that “emerged with the post-merger/acquisition organization” are termed
‘current’ (Bellou 2007, 69).

Bellou (2007) predicts employee perceptions relating to

organizational obligations and contributions will change during a merger/acquisition.
She also hypothesizes that the employees who feel less able to manage organizational
changes successfully are more likely to believe organizational obligations and
contributions have changed because o f a merger or acquisition.
Greek organizations that had been through a merger or acquisition in the last three
years, had 1,000 to 2,000 employees, and had offices located in Athens were asked to
distribute a questionnaire to their employees. The sample consisted o f non-managerial,
full-time employees who worked for at least six months before the merger or acquisition.
O f the 450 surveys that were handed out, 255 o f the surveys were complete and usable,
resulting in a 56.7% response rate. Items developed by Rousseau (1990) and Roehling et
al. (2000) were used to measure the previous and current psychological contracts. The
subjects were asked to indicate the extent to which their employer was obligated to
provide them with certain items.

They were also asked the extent to which their
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employer actually provided those items. The items were opportunity to promote, high
pay, pay according to performance, continuous education, long-term employment,
personal development, support for personal problems, interesting work, involvement in
decision-making, and recognition.

The objective was to measure changes in the

psychological contract, not contract breaches.

Employees’ coping ability was also

measured, using items developed by Judge et al. (1999). Factor analysis was used first to
test whether the items represented a single construct for the previous and the current
psychological contracts. T-tests were used to test the hypotheses.
As expected, employees’ perceptions changed for six out o f the ten obligations.
After the merger or acquisition, perceptions lowered for pay according to performance,
long-term employment, support for personal problems, involvement in decision-making,
and recognition, whereas perceptions rose for continuous education.

Perceptions

remained stable for opportunity to promote, high pay, personal development, and
interesting work. Employees’ perceptions changed for nine out o f ten contributions as
predicted.

The only one that did not change was continuous education.

The overall

results suggest that after the merger or acquisition process, employees give credit to the
organization for more transactional obligations (Bellou, 2007).
The results provide support for the hypothesis that the employees who do not feel
able to manage organizational changes successfully are more likely to believe
organizational obligations and contributions have changed. The employees who did not
trust themselves in managing changes believed there were major changes in six o f the ten
obligations. This group o f employees believed that the post-merger organization had less
o f an obligation to deliver high pay, pay according to performance, long-term
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employment, involvement in decision-making, and recognition. On the other hand, the
workers who did trust themselves to effectively manage change believed the post-merger
organization had more o f an obligation to provide continuous education. None o f the
other obligations changed. The employees who felt they were less able to successfully
deal with changes indicated nine o f the ten contributions changed. Again, continuous
education was unchanged. Participants who were more confident in their coping abilities
believed the only contribution that changed was support for personal problems.

The

overall findings reveal that employees’ coping ability significantly affects their
perceptions o f changes in the psychological contract.

Freese, Schalk, and Croon (2011)
The

psychological

contracts perceived

by

employees

are

impacted

by

organizational changes. The contract may be influenced by the consequences in the work
situation, changes in the work atmosphere, and/or the implementation process (Schalk,
Campbell, & Freese, 1998). It is investigated whether the perception o f an organizational
change leads to changes in employees’ psychological contracts (Freese, Schalk, and
Croon 2011). They hypothesize that the changes decrease the fulfillment o f perceived
organizational and employee obligations, and that the changes will increase the amount
o f psychological contract violations. It is also posited that the lack o f fulfillment, or the
violation o f perceived organizational obligations, is related to a decreased level o f
perceived employee obligations.
Organizational commitment and intention to turnover are analyzed as outcomes.
Two types o f organizational commitment from the Organizational Commitment Model
(Meyer & Allen, 1991) are o f interest, affective and continuance. Affective commitment
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is “the emotional attachment to or organization when employees identify with an
organization and enjoy the membership”, and continuance commitment is “based on the
perceived costs-benefits evaluation o f maintaining organizational membership” (Freese,
Schalk, and Croon 2011, 407). The definition o f intention to turnover is based on Lubich
(1997) as the desire to end employment with an organization.

It is additionally

hypothesized that when psychological contracts are violated more frequently, or if
perceived organizational obligations are fulfilled to a lesser extent, it is related to lower
levels o f affective and continuance commitment and higher levels o f intent to turnover.
Changes in the organization are expected to negatively affect the level o f affective and
continuance commitment and positively affect the level o f intention to turnover.
Three organizations located in The Netherlands were sampled by Freese, Schalk,
and Croon (2011).

Two o f the companies provide home care, while the third hosts

elderly people. One o f the home care organizations went through a merger that involved
major restructuring. The elderly homecare company was restructuring tasks in a way
similar to a merger. All o f the businesses, including the second homecare organization,
were reorganizing middle management. A questionnaire was distributed to 869 workers
five months before the restructuring/merger. There were 450 responses (52% response
rate). A second questionnaire was given one month after the restructuring or merger. O f
the 450 respondents from the first survey, 245 people completed the second one (59%
response rate).

Those people were given a third survey seven months after the

restructuring or merger, and 186 employees filled it out (76% response rate).
The survey has six parts beginning with demographic information. The second
part consists o f five scales about perceived organizational obligations including job
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content, career development, social atmosphere, organizational policies, and rewards
(Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2008). For all 40 items contained in the five scales, subjects
were asked if the degree o f fulfillment o f the perceived organizational obligations was
acceptable or not in order to measure experienced violations. Fourth, in-role and extra
role employee obligations were assessed using scales also developed by Freese, Schalk,
and Croon (2008). Affective commitment, continuance commitment, and intention to
turnover were all measured using items from others’ previously established scales. The
measure for organizational change asks if something in the employees’ work or the
organization changed in the last six months in a yes or no format.
Based on the regression o f organizational change on organizational obligations
and violations, it was found that organizational change has a significant negative effect
on the fulfillment o f some organizational obligations, including organizational policies
and rewards.

However, there were no significant effects on job content, career

development, or social atmosphere as predicted.

Organizational change did have a

significant impact on the number o f psychological contract violations as hypothesized.
Next, organizational change, organizational obligations, and violations were
regressed on in-role obligations, extra-role obligations, affective commitment, and
continuance commitment. Contrary to expectations, organizational change did not have
an effect on perceived in-role and extra-role employee obligations.

A lower level of

fulfillment o f career development, social atmosphere, and violations did have a negative
effect on in-role employee obligations. Affective commitment was impacted by lower
levels of fulfillment o f job content and organizational policies, and continuance
commitment was affected only by organizational policies. The level o f fulfillment of
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perceived employee obligations affected intention to turnover, although the level o f
fulfillment o f perceived organizational obligations did not. Organizational changes did
not significantly influence affective or continuance commitment.
Organizational change was regressed on intention to turnover.

Organizational

change does increase the intention to turnover as hypothesized. All o f the significant
effects are time-invariant, demonstrating that relationships between variables remained
constant over the period during which the three surveys were completed. The first time
the employees were surveyed was five months before the merger or restructuring took
place. More respondents indicated that a change had taken place at this time than they
did after the merger.

Freese, Schalk, and Croon (2011) interpret this as continuous

organizational change.

Summary
Many companies experience major organizational changes including mergers
(Sparrow 1996a; Tumley and Feldman 1998; Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson 2002;
Cortvriend 2004; Searle and Ball 2004; Bligh and Carsten 2005; Bellou 2007; Freese,
Schalk, and Croon 2011), de-mergers (Cortvriend, 2004), acquisitions (Turnley and
Feldman 1998; Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2011), and restructuring/reorganization
(Cangelosi, Markham, and Bounds 1998; Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2011). Researchers
have studied the changes in psychological contracts as a result o f organizational change
(Sparrow 1996a; Searle and Ball 2004; Bellou 2007; Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2011).
Bligh and Carsten (2005) examined changes in manager’s upward and downward
psychological contracts.
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Negative outcomes are associated with these changes in the psychological
contracts from major organizational changes.

They include turnover (Hubbard and

Purcell 2001; Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson 2002; Cortvriend 2004; Searle and Ball 2004),
turnover intentions ( Turnley and Feldman 1998; Cortvriend 2004; Freese, Schalk, and
Croon 2011), loyalty (Bligh & Carsten, 2005; Tumley & Feldman, 1998), job satisfaction
(Bligh & Carsten, 2005), and organizational commitment (Bligh and Carsten 2005;
Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2011). These outcomes were found using several different
methods: interviews (Bligh & Carsten, 2005; Searle & Ball, 2004; Sparrow, 1996b),
surveys (Bellou, 2007; Freese et al., 2011; Sparrow, 1996b; Tumley & Feldman, 1998),
and focus groups (Cortvriend, 2004; Sparrow, 1996b).

Other negative outcomes are

plausible, but they have not been analyzed in an organizational change setting at this
time.

Hypothesis Development
A psychological contract breach means “not only that a promise has not been met,
but also that [the employee] has made contributions in exchange for that promise that
have not been adequately reciprocated” by the employer (Morrison and Robinson 1997,
239). A psychological contract is considered relational when it “entails broad, openended and long-term

obligations” (Morrison and Robinson

transactional psychological contracts are “specific,

1997, 229), while

short-term,

and

monetizable

obligations entailing limited involvement o f the parties” (Morrison and Robinson 1997,
229).

Pay raises, promotions, and bonuses are transactional psychological contract

elements that are frequently affected by mergers and acquisitions.

Relational

psychological contract elements commonly impacted during organizational changes
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include job security, job responsibilities, and career development.

Each element is

analyzed separately since employees’ reactions to psychological contract breaches may
differ depending on what was breached. Also, employers may be able to reciprocate on
one element, but not another.

Using three elements o f each type o f psychological

contract also allows for a more general comparison between transactional and relational
psychological contract breaches.
Morrison and Robinson (1997) contend that employees are less likely to perceive
a breach in relational psychological contracts, and more relational expectations may be
better able to endure threats to the psychological contract (Rousseau, 2004). Therefore, it
is hypothesized that more perceived breaches in transactional psychological contracts are
also expected in a merger and acquisition setting. Promotions, pay raises, and bonuses
are transactional psychological contracts and therefore, are predicted to be more frequent
than the relational psychological contracts, which are job security, career development,
and job responsibilities.
H I:

Transactional psychological contract breaches are perceived more
frequently than relational psychological contract breaches.

As a result o f breaches in psychological contracts during mergers and
acquisitions, employees may experience feelings o f violation, which are “affective and
emotional experience[s] o f disappointment, frustration, anger, and resentment that may
emanate from an employee’s interpretation o f a contract breach and its accompanying
circumstances” (Morrison and Robinson 1997).

Feelings o f violation differ from a

psychological contract breach, which is a perception. Using factor analysis, Robinson
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and Morrison (2000) find that psychological contract breach and feelings o f violation are
separate constructs.
Morrison and Robinson (1997) contend that when a relational psychological
contract breach is perceived, the feelings o f violation are stronger.

Violations o f

transactional contracts may be remedied with an adjustment to the obligations, but
violations o f relational contracts may damage the relationship between employer and
employee (Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994).

Therefore, during organizational

changes, feelings o f violation resulting from relational psychological contract breaches
are anticipated to be more severe than when a transactional psychological contract is
breached.
H2:

Feelings o f violation from relational psychological contract
breaches are stronger than feelings o f violation from transactional
psychological contract breaches.

A positive relationship is hypothesized between the breach o f each psychological
contract and subsequent feelings o f violation.
H3a:

There is a positive relationship between a breach in a transactional
psychological contract and associated feelings o f violation.

H3b:

There is a positive relationship between a breach in a relational
psychological contract and associated feelings o f violation.

Equity theory states that employees compare their inputs to their outputs (Adams,
1965). In the case o f a psychological contract breach, the employee perceives that the
employer has not reciprocated their inputs with the promised outputs. According to the
equity theory, employees can restore equity by lowering their inputs (Adams, 1965). One
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way employees can do this is by reducing their performance. Similarly, employees can
reduce their behavior that goes beyond what is expected o f them.

Organizational

citizenship behavior (OCB) “represents individual behavior that is discretionary, not
directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and in the aggregate
promotes the efficient and effective functioning o f the organization” (Organ, 1988). Prior
research has found that breaches in psychological contracts during organizational change
result in decreased job satisfaction (Bligh & Carsten, 2005). This finding is in line with
the equity theory. If employees are experiencing inequity, it follows that they are not
satisfied with their job.
During organizational changes, “the autonomy to act consistently and in
accordance with deeply-held beliefs may be challenged” (Nesterkin 2013, 577).
According to the reactance theory, a reduction in autonomy can provoke employees to
participate in restricted behaviors (Brehm 1966; Brehm and Brehm 1981; Wicklund
1974). Workplace deviance is “voluntary behavior violating significant organizational
norms and, in doing so, threatens the well-being o f the organization or its members, or
both” (Robinson and Bennett 1995).

Organizational deviance is directed at the

organization (Bennett & Robinson, 2000).
It is theorized that stronger feelings o f violation will lead to decreased employee
performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and job satisfaction as well as
increased organizational deviance.
H4a:

There is a negative relationship between feelings o f violation and
employee performance.
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H 4b:

There is a negative relationship between feelings o f violation and
organizational citizenship behavior.

H4c:

There is a negative relationship between feelings o f violation and
job satisfaction.

H4d:

There is a positive relationship between feelings o f violation and
organizational deviance.

Suazo and Stone-Romero (2011) examine the mediating role o f feelings o f
violation on the relationship between a breach in contract and employee behavior, though
it was not in an organizational change setting.

The authors found that feelings o f

violation mediate the relationship between psychological contract breach and in-role
performance

(Suazo &Stone-Romero, 2011), such that performance was impacted most

for employees who had a stronger emotional reaction to a psychological contract breach.
It is posited that feelings o f violation will mediate the direct relationship between
psychological contract breaches and employee performance in a merger or acquisition
situation.

It is also hypothesized that the direct relationships between psychological

contract breach and the outcomes o f organizational citizenship behaviors, job satisfaction,
and organizational deviance are mediated by feelings o f violation.
H5a:

Feelings o f

violation

mediate

the

relationship

between

psychological contract breaches and employee performance.
H 5b:

Feelings o f

violation

mediate

the

relationship

between

psychological contract breaches and organizational citizenship
behavior.
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H5c:

Feelings

of

violation mediate

the

relationship between

psychological contract breaches and job satisfaction.

H5d: Feelings

of

violation mediate

the

relationship between

psychological contract breaches and organizational deviance.
Organizational justice affects the way employees feel during mergers and
acquisitions. Based on case studies, Hubbard and Purcell observe “the way in which
actions were conducted and explained to employees appeared to be the most important”
to employees during acquisitions (2001, 31). The way decisions are made is a part o f
justice, which is based on the fairness o f procedures used to reach a decision.

The

explanations o f decisions are also a part o f justice that depends on the level o f respect
with which people are treated and the level o f communication or quality o f explanations.
If an employee that experiences a breach o f psychological contract, but believes that the
outcome, decision-making process, and/or communication is fair, they may not be as
upset about the breach and experience less feelings o f violation. It is hypothesized that
organizational justice reduces the feelings o f violation from a perceived psychological
contract breach.

H6:

Organizational

justice

moderates

the

relationship

between

psychological contract breaches and feelings o f violation.
Prior research has found that organizational change results in increased turnover
intentions (Tumley and Feldman 1998; Cortvriend 2004; Freese, Schalk, and Croon
2011) and increased turnover (Hubbard and Purcell 2001; Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson
2002; Cortvriend 2004; Searle and Ball 2004) for employees. These studies were able to
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observe how many employees ultimately left the company, but they were not able to
interview or survey those who left the organization.
Some employees are forced to leave the organization, while other employees
make the choice to terminate their employment. Employees who leave the organization
because they have no other choice are Involuntary Leavers. Those who choose to leave
the organization are Voluntary Leavers.

O f the workers who remain with the

organization, some stay because they have no other choice (Involuntary Stayers) and
others stay because they choose to (Voluntary Stayers). It is theorized that Voluntary
Leavers and Involuntary Stayers perceive a higher number o f breaches, more severe
breaches, and stronger feelings o f violation from breaches in the psychological contracts
than Involuntary Leavers and Voluntary Stayers.

H7a:

There are more psychological contract breaches perceived by
Voluntary Leavers and Involuntary Stayers than Involuntary
Leavers and Voluntary Stayers.

H7b: The psychological contract breaches are more severe for Voluntary
Leavers and Involuntary Stayers than Involuntary Leavers and
Voluntary Stayers.

H7c:

Feelings o f violation are stronger for Voluntary Leavers and Involuntary
Stayers than Involuntary Leavers and Voluntary Stayers.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Amazon Mechanical Turk “Workers” were used as the subjects for a survey
testing the effects o f psychological contract breaches during mergers and acquisitions.
Established, Likert-type scales are used to measure psychological contract breaches,
feelings o f violation, and the outcomes o f employee performance, organizational
citizenship behavior, job satisfaction, and organizational deviance. All items are selfreported. The hypotheses are tested using ANOVA and Structural Equations Modeling.

Participants
Participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk completed a survey.

The

“Workers” on Mechanical Turk choose the tasks they wish to complete, which are called
Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs).

To improve the quality o f the data, the initial

qualifications were set so that the respondents needed to have a 97% accuracy rating,
meaning that they have successfully completed 97% o f the Human Intelligence Tasks
(HITs) attempted. They were also required to have completed at least 50 HITs and have
a registered address in the United States. If the “Workers” did not meet these initial
qualifications, they were not able to access the survey. Before they are hired, though,
they are voluntarily screened to be sure that they meet the study’s specific requirements.
“Workers” for this study must have worked or currently work for a company that has
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experienced a merger or an acquisition in the United States in order to participate in the
study (and hence get paid).Of the 1,507 people who started the survey, 864 o f them did
not qualify because they did not work or previously work for a company that experienced
a merger o f acquisition.

An additional 32 participants did not qualify for the survey

because the company was located outside o f the United States.

Nineteen qualified

respondents were removed from the survey for failing one o f three attention check
questions.

Ninety-two people did not finish the survey.

A total o f 500 complete

responses were collected from Mechanical Turk.
Seven respondents were removed from the Mechanical Turk sample. One subject
took the pilot test; one did not correctly enter the survey code on Mechanical Turk; two
submitted the survey twice; and three did not provide the name o f the company for which
they worked. O f the 493 usable responses, the average age is 34 years old, 62.5% are
male, and the mean tenure with the company is almost seven years. Also, 46.9% are
employees with no managerial duties (rank=l), 22.7% are lower level management
(rank=2), 22.5% are middle level management (rank=3), 3.2% are top level management
(rank=4), and 4.7% are professionals (rank=5). Males and females were coded one and
two, respectively.

This information is displayed in Table 2.

requirement to become a Mechanical Turk Worker is 18 years old.

The minimum age
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Table 2
Demographic Information

Mean

Median

Range

Std. Dev.

Tenure

6.8

5.0

45.5

5.3

Age

34.4

32.0

51.0

10.1

Rank

3.0

3.0

4.0

1.1

Gender

1.4

1.0

1.0

0.5

Survey Design
The survey consists o f established scales for psychological contract breaches,
feelings

of

violation,

job

satisfaction,

organizational

deviance,

performance,

organizational citizenship behaviors, and organizational justice. The respondents are also
asked about the company, their employment status, and demographic information. To
ensure active participation, three attention checks are used throughout the survey. The
average completion time was 13 minutes.

Each participant who passed all o f the

attention questions and completed the survey was paid $2.00.

Variable Measurements
Exogenous Variables

Psychological Contract Breaches
Pay raises, promotions, and bonuses are common elements o f transactional
psychological contracts that are affected by mergers and acquisitions.

Elements o f

relational psychological contracts frequently impacted during organizational changes
include job security, job responsibilities, and career development. Each element is tested
as a separate psychological contract in order to identify the individual effects a merger or
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acquisition has on the various elements o f the psychological contract. The extent o f a
psychological contract breach is measured using a five item, global measure (Robinson &
Morrison, 2000), which was modified to refer to each o f the six psychological contract
elements. Respondents indicate the extent o f the perceived breach on 5-point Likert-type
scales. A high score indicates a more severe breach. Some o f the items, as modified for
the psychological contract breach promotion, are “I have not received everything
promised to me [about promotions] in exchange for my contributions” and “My employer
has broken many o f its promises [about promotions] to me even though I’ve upheld my
side o f the deal” (Robinson & Morrison, 2000). The reported coefficient alpha for these
items is 0.92 (Robinson & Morrison, 2000). The scale is used six times in this study, and
the reliabilities are 0.94 to 0.95.

Organizational Justice
Organizational justice is tested with a scale developed by Ambrose and Schminke
(2009). An overall justice scale is used because it has been suggested that the specificity
o f justice measurement should match the specificity o f measurement used for the
outcomes (Colquitt & Shaw, 2005).

In this case, global measures are used for the

outcomes, so a global scale is used for justice, too.

The measure for organizational

justice consists o f six items, including “Overall, I’m treated fairly by my organization”
and “For the most part, this organization treats its employees fairly” (Ambrose and
Schminke 2009). The items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale that ranges from
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.

The alpha for the overall justice scale is 0.93

(Ambrose & Schminke, 2009). In this study, the reliability is 0.94.
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Endogenous Variables

Feelings of Violation
Feelings o f violation are associated with a specific element o f a psychological
contract breach. Feelings o f violation from a breach in raises, bonuses, promotions, job
responsibilities, job security, and career development are measured individually.
Feelings o f violation are measured using a global scale with four items, modified for
each psychological contract element.

The items for feelings o f violation from a

psychological contract breach in job responsibilities, for example, include “I feel a great
deal o f anger toward my organization [over job responsibilities]”, “I feel betrayed by my
organization [with regard to job responsibilities”, “I feel that my organization has
violated the contract [about job responsibilities] between us”, and “I feel extremely
frustrated by how I have been treated by my organization

[relating to job

responsibilities]” (Robinson & Morrison, 2000). The responses ranged from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

The reported coefficient alpha for this scale is 0.92

(Robinson & Morrison, 2000).

In this study, the scale is used six times, and the

reliabilities are 0.95 to 0.96.

Employee Performance
Employee performance was measured as in-role behaviors (Williams and
Anderson 1991). In-role behaviors are those that are explicitly expected o f an employee.
This is a seven item scale and includes statements such as “Adequately completes
assigned duties” and “Performs tasks that are expected o f him/her”.

Williams and

Anderson's (1991) results demonstrate that in-role behaviors and OCBs are separate
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constructs. This scale is also scored on a typical 5-point Likert-type scale. The reported
reliability for this scale is 0.91 (Williamson, 1981), and is 0.88 in this study.

Organizational Citizenship
The OCBs examined are those that benefit the organization.

Organizational

citizenship was measured using Lee and Allen's (2002) organizational citizenship
behaviors (OCB) towards the organization scale.

The scale consists o f eight items.

Examples are “Defend the organization when other employees criticize it” and “Offer
ideas to improve the functioning o f the organization” (Lee & Allen, 2002). The scoring
is on a traditional Likert-type scale with five options ranging from strongly disagree to
strongly agree. This scale has a reported reliability o f 0.88 (Lee & Allen, 2002). The
reliability in the current study is 0.92.

Job Satisfaction
The scale used to measure job satisfaction is an abridged version o f the original
Job in General (JIG) scale created by (Ironson, Smith, Brannick, & Gibson, 1989). The
abridged JIG scale consists o f eight adjectives and short phrases and the respondents
indicate whether the word or phrase describes his/her job (Russell et al., 2004).

The

subject selects “yes”, “?”, or “no”, and this is scored as 3, 1, and 0, respectively. While
the original JIG scale contained eighteen items, the eight items o f the abridged version
consist o f “good,” “undesirable,” “better than most,” “disagreeable,” “makes me
content,” “excellent,” “enjoyable,” and “poor.” This scale was selected since it is more
efficient and the general nature allows the scale to be used across industries and ranks.
The abridged scale has a reported alpha coefficient o f 0.85 (Ironson et al., 1989). The
reliability in this dissertation is 0.93.
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Organizational Deviance
Organizational deviance is analyzed using the scale developed by Bennett and
Robinson (2000). The scale includes twelve deviant behaviors that vary in seriousness.
Examples are “Neglected to follow your boss’s instruction”, “Littered your work
environment”, and “Taken property from work without permission”. Subjects are asked
to indicate on a scale o f one to seven how often they engage in a particular behavior. The
scale anchors are never (1), once a year (2), twice a year (3), several times a year (4),
monthly (5), weekly (6), and daily (7). The reported Chronbach’s alpha for these items is
0.81 ((Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The reliability in the current study is 0.85.

Employment Status
Employment status is assessed by asking respondents to select the statement that
best describes their employment status.

The following statements were used to

categorize subjects into four employment status classifications: “I have stayed with the
company because I wanted to stay” Voluntary Stayers); “I have stayed with the company
because I can’t leave” (Involuntary Stayers); “I left the company because I wanted to
leave” (Voluntary Leavers); and “I left the company because I had no other choice”
(Involuntary Leavers).

These statements are based on category descriptions used by

(Hon, Mitchell, Lee, and Griffeth 2014).

Demographic Variables
Groups that have been assumed to have lower psychological attachment to the old
employment relationship are employees o f a low rank, with a shorter tenure, young,
and/or female (Turnley & Feldman, 1998). Therefore, rank, tenure, age, and gender are
included as control variables. The options for rank are: employee with no managerial
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duties, lower level management, middle level management, top level management, and
professional. Tenure and age are measured in years.

Hypothesis Testing
HI:

Transactional psychological contract breaches are perceived more
frequently than relational psychological contract breaches.

Promotions, pay raises, and bonuses are the transactional psychological contract
breaches predicted to be more frequent than the relational psychological contracts, which
are job security, career development, and job responsibilities.

The frequency o f

psychological contract breaches is based on the average scores on the psychological
contract scales. The psychological contract breach scale consists o f five items on a scale
o f 1 to 5 (l=Strongly Disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree; 4=Agree;
5=Strongly Agree). Frequency is measured as the number o f average breach scores that
are greater than or equal to 3.5, which is the mid-point between Neither Agree nor
Disagree and Agree.

At 3.5, the average response is no longer neutral and indicates

agreement with a psychological contract breach.

The maximum possible number o f

transactional psychological contract breaches is three, as is the maximum for the number
o f relational psychological contract breaches. This hypothesis is tested using a pairedsample t-test.

H2:

Feelings o f violation from relational psychological contract
breaches are stronger than feelings o f violation from transactional
psychological contract breaches.

The feelings o f violation from breaches o f relational psychological contract (job
security, career development, and job responsibilities) are predicted to be stronger than
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the feelings o f violation from the breaches o f transactional psychological contracts
(bonus, promotion, and pay raises). Only the respondents who experienced at least one
transactional and one relational breach are included in the sample for this test.

The

severity o f feelings of violation from transactional psychological contract breaches is
measured as the average o f the scores on the feelings o f violation scales associated with
the transactional psychological contract breaches that were experienced by each
respondent. Respondents may have experienced one, two, or three breaches based on the
calculation in hypothesis 1.

Severity o f feelings o f violation from relational

psychological contract breaches is measured in the same way. This hypothesis is also
tested using a paired-sample t-test.

H3a: There is a positive relationship between a breach in a transactional
psychological contract and associated feelings o f violation.

H3b: There is a positive relationship between a breach in a relational
psychological contract and associated feelings o f violation.
Each subject is asked about the six psychological contract breaches and the
associated feelings o f violation, which are tested using six different models.

These

relationships are tested with Structural Equations Modeling. The relationship between
the breach and feelings o f violation is depicted as H3 in Figure 1.

H4a:

There is a negative relationship between feelings o f violation and
employee performance.

H4b: There is a negative relationship between feelings o f violation and
organizational citizenship behavior.
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H4c:

There is a negative relationship between feelings o f violation and
job satisfaction.

H4d:

There is a positive relationship between feelings o f violation and
organizational deviance.

The relationship between feelings o f violation and the outcomes o f job satisfaction,
organizational citizenship behaviors, organizational deviance, and employee performance
are shown as H4 on Figure 1.

Structural Equations Modeling is used to test these

hypotheses.
H 5a: Feelings

of

violation

mediate

the

relationship

between

psychological contract breaches and employee performance.
H 5b: Feelings

of

violation

mediate

the

relationship

between

psychological contract breaches and organizational citizenship
behavior.
H5c: Feelings

of

violation

mediate

the

relationship

between

psychological contract breaches and job satisfaction.
H5d: Feelings

of

violation mediates

the

relationship

between

psychological contract breaches and organizational deviance.
The same dependent variables are used in each o f the six models.
relationships are also tested using Structural Equations Modeling.

The hypothesized

mediated relationship is labeled H5 on Figure 1.
H6:

Organizational
psychological
violation.

justice

moderates

the

relationship

contract breaches and associated

These

between

feelings of
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Organizational justice is tested as a moderator using Multiple Group Analysis and
Structural Equations Modeling. The predicted moderation is shown as H6 in Figure 1.

Theorized Model: Hypotheses 3,4, 5, & 6
Feelings of
Violation
Pay R aises
B on u ses
P rom otions
Job R e sp o n sib ilitie s
Job Security
Career D evelop m en t

Psychological

Employee P erform ance

C ontract B reach

O rganizational Citizenship

Pay R aises

Job Satisfaction

B o n u ses

O rganizational D eviance

P rom otion s
Job R e sp o n sib ilitie s
Job Security
C areer D ev elo p m en t

Figure 1 - Theorized Model

H7a:

There are more psychological contract breaches perceived by
Voluntary Leavers and Involuntary Stayers than Involuntary
Leavers and Voluntary Stayers.

H7b: The psychological contract breaches are more severe for Voluntary
Leavers and Involuntary Stayers than Involuntary Leavers and
Voluntary Stayers.
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H7c:

Feelings o f violation are stronger for Voluntary Leavers and
Involuntary Stayers than Involuntary Leavers and Voluntary
Stayers.

Frequency o f psychological contract breaches is calculated the same as in
Hypothesis 1, which is the number o f psychological contract breach averages that are 3.5
or over. In Hypothesis 7, however, all psychological contract breaches are considered
simultaneously, such that the highest possible number o f psychological contract breaches
is 6, versus three in Hypothesis 1. The severity o f psychological contract breaches is
measured as the average psychological contract breach score, which can range from 1
(Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree).

The severity o f feelings o f violation is

measured as it was in Hypothesis 2, where only the respondents with at least one
transactional and one relational breach are included in the test, and the feelings of
violation associated with the breaches actually experienced are averaged. Three, one
way ANOVAs are conducted to test for differences in frequency and severity o f
psychological contract breaches and the severity o f feelings o f violation between
Voluntary Stayers, Involuntary Stayers, Voluntary Leavers, and Involuntary Leavers.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

Survey Administration
A pilot study was successfully conducted to ensure the intended sample o f
employees who have been through a merger or acquisition could be collected using an
online survey on Mechanical Turk. It took an average o f thirteen minutes for participants
to successfully finish the survey.

They were paid $2 each for their responses.

The

Structural Equations Model contains 44 scale items. It is recommended to have at least
five to 10 observations per scale item (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2010).
Five hundred Mechanical Turk Workers who have been through a merger or acquisition
completed the survey.

Seven responses were excluded from the final sample. Three

respondents did not provide a company name, one respondent already took the pilot
study, another respondent did not accurately submit his response to Mechanical Turk, and
two responses were submitted twice (only one response per Worker was kept) for a final
sample size o f 493.

Attention Checks
Three attention checks were included in the survey to ensure that the participants
remained observant. They were “For this question, mark Neither Agree nor Disagree”,
“Please select Disagree”, and “Choose Agree as the answer to this question”.
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Respondents were removed from the survey after missing one attention check, and their
responses were not used.

Those who were removed from the survey did not receive

paym ent

Demographic Information
Five subjects chose not to disclose their age, and one subject did not provide his
tenure with the company. Because the responses were otherwise complete, the mean age
and tenure was used for these participants. This method is appropriate when the amount
of data missing is small and randomly occurring, as in this study (Hair et al., 2010). The
average age is 34 years old, with a range o f 18 to 69 years old. 62.5% o f the sample is
male. Males were coded as one (1), and women were coded as two (2). The mean tenure
with the company is almost seven years, ranging from half o f a year to 45.5 years. 46.9%
are employees with no managerial duties (rank=l), 22.7% are lower level management
(rank=2), 22.5% are middle level management (rank=3), 3.2% are top level management
(rank=4), and 4.7% are professionals (rank=5).

This information is tabulated and

presented in Table 2. The correlations between the demographic variables are presented
in Table 3.
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Table 3
Demographic Information: Correlation Table

C o rre la tio n
R an k -T en u re
T en u re-G en d e r
T enure-A ge
R ank-A ge
G ender-A ge
R an k -G e n d er

0.228***
0.052
0.493*
0.154***
0.115**
-0.082*

***Significant at p=0.01
**Significant at p-0.05
*Significant at p = 0 .10

Control Variables
The control variables o f rank, age, tenure, and gender were included in the model,
which can be seen in Figure 2.

Feelings o f
Violation
Pay R aises
B on u ses
Prom otion s
Job R e sp o n sib ilities
Job Security
Career D evelop m en t

Psychological
C ontract Breach
H5

Pay R aises

Employee Perform ance
O rganizational Citizenship
Job Satisfaction
O rganizational Deviance

B on u ses
P rom otions
Job R esp o n sib ilities
Job Security

Control

Career D evelop m en t

V ariables

Figure 2 Theorized Model with Control Variables
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The controls were correlated with the endogenous construct, psychological
contract breach, which can be seen in Table 4. As mentioned previously, rank was coded
as follows: employees with no managerial duties (rank=l), lower level management
(rank=2), middle level management (rank=3), top level management (rank=4), and
professionals (rank=5). Gender was coded as one for males and two for females. The
psychological contract breaches o f raises, promotions, and career development are
significantly correlated with tenure. The negative correlations indicate employees with a
lower tenure perceive more severe psychological contract breaches relating to raises,
promotions, and career development. The psychological contract breach o f job security
is significantly correlated with age, such that older employees perceive a more severe
psychological contract breach in job security.

Table 4
Control Variables: Correlations with Psychological Contract Breaches

Raise
B reach-T enurc

Bonus

P rom otion

Job
Responsibilities

J o b S ecurity

C a re e r
D evelopm ent

-0.116**

-0.035

-0.165***

B rcach-A ge

-0.052

-0.025

41.036

0.011

B reach-R ank

-0.075

-0.021

-0.063

-0.015

-0.063

-0.034

B reach-G ender

0.034

0.050

0.000

0.070

0.018

0.008

-0.062

-0.050
0.109**

-0.081
0.036

"""Significant at p=O.OI
"‘ Significant at p-0.05
"Significant at p = 0 .10

Relationships between the control variables and the exogenous constructs o f
feelings o f violation, employee performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and
organizational deviance are also included in the model.

The standardized regression

weights o f these relationships are displayed in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
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Table 5
Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r Control Variables and Feelings
o f Violation

Raise
V iolation-Tenure

0.004

Bonus
0.002

P rom otion
0.041

Jo b
Responsibilities

J o b Security

C a reer
D evelopm ent

0.036

0.027

-0.038

-0.030

-0.051 ♦♦

Violation-Age

-0.021

0.002

-0.008

Violation-R ank

-0.026

-0.033

-0.018

-0.003

-

0.011

-0.008

V iolation-G ender

0.028

0.021

0.026

-0.031

-0.003

0.003

0.074**

♦♦♦Significant at p=0.01
♦♦Significant at p-0.05
♦Significant at p = 0 .10

Table 6
Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r Control Variables and
Employee Performance
Raise

Bonus

Prom otion

Jo b
Responsibilities

Pcrform ance-Tenure

0.002

0.014

Perform ance-Age

0.080

0.081

0.080*

Perform ance-R ank

0.042

0.047

0.047

0.151***

0.152***

0.145***

0.142***

Pcrform ance-G cnder

0.004

-0.024

J o b Security

C areer
Development

0.004

0.015

0.126**

0.108*

0.082

0.054

0.038

0.049

0.139***

0.141***

♦♦♦Significant at p=0.01
♦♦Significant at p-0.05
♦Significant at p = 0.10

Table 7
Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r Control Variables and
Organizational Citizenship Behavior

Raise
O C B -T enure

Bonus

P rom otion

Jo b
R esponsibilities

J o b S ecurity

C a re e r
D evelopm ent

0.116**

0.136***

0.090*

0.097**

0.110**

0.103**

0.013

0.013

0.037

0.059

0.072

0.049

O C B -R an k

0.146***

0.161***

0.153***

0.167***

0.143***

0.157***

O C B -G en d er

0.126***

0.128***

0.114***

0.121***

0.107**

0.109***

O C B -A ge

♦♦♦Significant at p=O.OI
♦♦Significant at p-0.05
♦Significant at p = 0 .10
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Table 8
Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r Control Variables and Job
Satisfaction

Raise
Satisfaction-Tenure

0.041

Satisfaction-Age

-0.170*"

Satisfaction-Rank

0.067

Satisfaction-G ender

-0.028

Bonus
0.070
-0 .168"*
0.084**
-0.022

Prom otion

Job
Responsibilities

0.004

0.015

-0.1.14***

-0 .1 0 8 "

0.070*

0 .1 0 1 "

-0.047

-0.021

Jo b Security

C areer
Development

0.025

0.016
-0 110**

-0.072

0.086**

0.050
-0.058

-0.055

***Significant at p=O.OI
**Significant at p-0.05
‘ Significant at p = 0 .10

Table 9
Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r Control Variables and
Organizational Deviance

Raise
Deviance-Tcnurc
Deviance-Age
D eviance-R ank
Deviance-G ender

0 . 01.1

Bonus

P rom otion

Jo b
R esponsibilities

C areer
D evelopm ent

0.008

0.025

-0.224*”

-0.212***

-0 .2 5 7 * "

-0.245***

-0.2.16*"

-0.054

-0.066

-0.065

-0.073

-0.061

-0.069

-0 .1 4 6 "*

-0.127***

-0.132***

-0.127***

-0.126***

-0.127***

-0.214***

0.036

J o b Security
0.016

0.020

“ ‘ Significant at p = 0 .0 1
“ Significant at p-0.05
‘ Significant at p = 0 .10

Feelings o f Violation
The results for the relationships between the control variables and feelings o f
violation can be seen in Table 5.

Age and tenure are significantly related to feelings o f

violation from job responsibilities. This relationship with age is positive, suggesting that
older subjects experience higher feelings o f violation. The negative relationship between
tenure and job responsibilities indicates that employees with lower tenure perceive more
severe feelings o f violation.
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Employee Performance
Table 6 displays the standardized regression weights for the relationship between
the control variables and employee performance.

Age is significantly related to

performance in the promotion, job responsibilities, and job security models.
respondents report higher performance.

Older

Gender is significantly related to employee

performance in all six models, which indicates that males report higher performance.

Organizational Citizenship Behavior
The standardized regression weights for the relationship between the control
variables and OCB are shown in Table 7. Rank and gender are significantly related to
organizational citizenship behaviors for all models. Males and those higher ranked in the
company report higher organizational citizenship behavior.

Tenure is significantly

related to OCB for all psychological contracts except for job responsibilities, such that
employees with longer tenure report higher organizational citizenship behaviors.

Job Satisfaction
The results for the relationship between the control variables and job satisfaction
are presented in Table 8. Rank is significantly related to job satisfaction for bonuses,
promotions, job responsibilities, and career development. The relationship is positive,
indicating that respondents with a higher rank in the company report higher job
satisfaction. Age is significantly and negatively related to job satisfaction in all models
except for job security. This means that older employees report lower job satisfaction.
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Organizational Deviance
Table 9 displays the standardized regression weights for the relationship between
the control variables and organizational deviance. Age and gender are both significantly
related to organizational deviance. Age was negatively related to deviance. Younger
employees reported participating in more deviant acts than older employees. Gender was
coded as male=l and female=2, so the negative relationship to deviance suggests that
males reported engaging in more deviant acts than women.

Dependent T-Tests
Hypothesis 1 Results
The psychological contract breaches (pay raises, bonuses, promotions, job
responsibilities, job security, and career development) are measured with a five item, 5point scale (Robinson & Morrison, 2000). For H I, frequency is computed as described
above. Average psychological contract breach scores above 3.5 are counted, such that
the highest score possible for the number o f transactional psychological contract breaches
is three and the highest score possible for the number o f relational psychological contract
breaches is three. The lowest score is zero. This can be seen in Table 10.
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Table 10
Number o f Participants Who Experienced Psychological Contract Breaches
No Breach
(1.00-3.49)

Breach
(3.50-5.00)

Raise

378

115

Bonus

392

101

Promotion

379

114

Job Responsibilities

406

87

Job Security

405

88

Career Development

379

144

As seen in Table 1, the most commonly experienced psychological contract
breach is a breach in career development (29%), followed by raises (23%), promotions
(23%), bonuses (20%), job security (18%), and job responsibilities (18%).
breaks down the frequency o f psychological contract breaches even further.

Table 11
Slightly

more than half o f the respondents experienced at least one psychological contract breach
during a merger or acquisition, and eleven o f them experienced all six psychological
contract breaches.

Table 11
Number o f Participants Who Experienced Psychological Contract Breaches
T ra n s a c tio n a l
B re a c h e s

R e la tio n a l
B re a c h e s

A ll B re a c h e s

0

295

318

242

1

98

89

86

2

68

58

60

3

32

28

45

4

33

5

16

6

11
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A dependent/paired sample t-test is appropriate for HI since two means from the
same respondents are being compared (mean frequency o f transactional psychological
contract breaches and mean frequency o f relational psychological contract breaches). The
assumptions for this test are normality and interval level data. The interval level data
requirement is met.

Although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test o f normality indicates a

significant violation from normality for the frequency o f transactional psychological
contract breaches and the frequency o f relational contract breaches, the distribution
appears fairly normal.

Also, according to the central limit theorem, the sampling

distribution tends to be normal in large samples (n=30 or more), no matter the shape o f
the actual data (Field, 2009). With the normal appearance and the large sample size, the
results from the t-test can be interpreted as usual.
The possible scores for frequency o f transactional and relational psychological
contract breaches are 0, 1, 2, or 3. The mean number o f transactional psychological
contract breaches is 0.67, and the mean number o f relational psychological contract
breaches is 0.59. This difference is significant at p=0.042. As seen in Tables 10 and 11,
Table 10 and Table 11, a large part o f the sample did not experience the
psychological contract breaches and scored zero for the frequency o f psychological
contract breaches, resulting in the low means o f 0.67 and 0.59.

Hypothesis 1 is

supported; transactional psychological contract breaches are perceived more frequently
than relational psychological contract breaches.

Hypothesis 2 Results
The respondents who experienced at least one transactional and one relational
breach (n=122) are used to test this hypothesis. The severity o f feelings o f violation from
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transactional psychological contract breaches is measured as the average o f the scores on
the feelings o f violation scales associated with the transactional psychological contract
breaches that were experienced by each respondent. Respondents may have experienced
one, two, or three breaches based on the calculation in hypothesis 1. Severity o f feelings
o f violation from relational psychological contract breaches is measured in the same way.
A dependent/paired sample t-test is also appropriate for H2 since two means from
the same respondents are being compared (mean severity o f feelings o f violation from
transactional psychological contract breaches and mean severity o f feelings o f violation
from relational psychological contract breaches). The same assumptions apply for this
hypothesis test. The data is interval level, but the Kolmogorov-Smimov test o f normality
shows a significant violation from normality for the severity o f feelings o f violation from
transactional psychological contract breaches and the severity o f feelings o f violation
from relational contract breaches.
The distributions appear close to normal. As with H I, the results from the t-test
can be interpreted regularly due to the large sample size (Field, 2009). The mean severity
o f feelings o f violation from transactional psychological contract breaches is 3.95, while
the mean severity o f feelings o f violation from relational psychological contract breaches
is 3.80.

The difference is insignificant (p=1.00).

The results were in the opposite

direction o f the hypothesis and would have been significant had the hypothesis been
reversed. Hypothesis 2 is not supported, as the mean severity o f feelings o f violation
from relational psychological contract breaches is lower than the mean severity o f
feelings o f violation from transactional psychological contract breaches.

92

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Factor Loadings
The standardized regression weights, also called factor loadings, indicate
convergent validity. It is recommended that the standardized regression weights be at
least 0.50 (Hair et al., 2010). For all six models, there were several items with factor
scores below the recommended 0.50 threshold, and the items with the lowest factor
scores were removed first.

The smallest factor loading was the fifth item of the

performance scale, “I engage in activities that will directly affect my performance
evaluation”, which was removed from all models. Five items from the 12-item deviance
scale did not meet the 0.50 minimum, and were also removed. The following items were
removed from the deviance scale: “Discussed confidential company information with an
unauthorized person”, “Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the jo b ”, “Falsified a
receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business expenses”,
“Littered your work environment”, and “Taken property from work without permission”.
Most o f the items dropped from the organizational deviance scale are illegal activities,
and the ones that remain in the scale have more to do with a lack o f effort. Not only do
these items not meet the 0.50 minimum, it also makes sense that participation in illegal
activities does not necessarily correlate with less severe deviant acts. A total o f 38 o f the
original 44 items remained in the models.

The remaining items in all six models have

standardized regression weights above 0.50.

Model Fit
The fit o f the models was analyzed next.

The Root Mean Square Error o f

Approximation (RMSEA) includes model complexity and the sample size in its
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calculation, which is advantageous over other measures o f fit that could reject models
that have a large sample size or a large number o f observed variables, both o f which are
present in this study (Hair et al. 2010, 748). A lower RMSEA indicates a better fit. The
comparative fit index (CFI) has “relative...insensitivity to model complexity” and is
another widely used measure o f fit (Hair et al. 2010, 749). The CFI can range from zero
to one, with a higher number signifying a better fit. For models with sample sizes over
250 and the number o f observed variables over 30, it is recommended that the RMSEA
be 0.08 or lower, with CFI o f 0.92 or above (Hair et al. 2010, 753). All o f the models
exhibit good fit, as can be seen in Table 12.

Table 12
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fit Indices: Root Mean Square Error o f Approximation &
Comparative Fit Index
RM SEA

CFI

R aise

0.054

0.933

B onus

0.054

0.933

P ro m o tio n

0.053

0.934

J o b R e sp o n sib ilities

0.056

0.925

J o b S e c u rity

0.055

0.934

C a r e e r D ev e lo p m e n t

0.054

0.931

Convergent Validity
Convergent validity is defined as the “extent to which a set o f measured variables
actually represents the theoretical latent construct those variables are designed to
measure.” (Hair et al. 2010, 771).

The Average Variance Extracted and Construct

Reliability are calculated to assess convergent validity. These tests are based on the 38
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items that remained in the model after Confirmatory Factor Analysis.

Items were

removed from the employee performance and organizational deviance scales. None of
the items from organizational citizenship behavior and job satisfaction scales were
removed.
The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) was computed for each latent construct.
The variance extracted is “a summary measure o f convergence among a set o f items
representing a latent construct. It is the average percentage o f variation explained among
the items” (Hair et al. 2010, 773). As a general guideline, it is recommended that the
AVE be 0.50 or higher (Hair et al., 2010). In all six models, there is one construct that
does not meet this recommendation, which is deviance. The AVE for deviance is lower
than preferred at 0.44 for all psychological contract breaches, as seen in Table 13.

Table 13
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Convergent Validity: Average Variance Extracted

Raise

Breach

Violation

Performance

OCB

Satisfaction

Deviance

0.79

0.79

0.54

0.58

0.61

0.44

Bonus

0.78

0.87

0.54

0.58

0.61

0.44

Promotion

0.77

0.85

0.54

0.58

0.61

0.44

Job Responsibilities

0.76

0.83

0.54

0.58

0.61

0.44

Job Security

0.81

0.86

0.54

0.58

0.61

044

Career Development

0.77

0.85

0.54

0.58

0.61

0.44

Construct Reliability (CR), which measures the “reliability and internal
consistency o f the measured variables representing a latent construct”, is also used to
analyze convergent validity (Hair et al. 2010, 771). As a rule o f thumb, the CR should be
0.7 or higher (Hair et al., 2010). All o f the constructs in all o f the models meet this
criterion. This is displayed in Table 14.
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Table 14

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Convergent Validity: Construct Reliability
Breach

Violation

Performance

OCB

Satisfaction

Deviance

Raise

0.95

0.96

0.88

0.92

0.93

0.85

Bonus

0.95

0.96

0.88

0.92

0.93

0.85

Promotion

0.94

0.96

0.88

0.92

0.93

0.85

Job Responsibilities

0.94

0.95

0.88

0.92

0.93

0.85

Job Security

0.95

0.96

0.88

0.92

0.93

0.85

Career Development

0.94

0.96

0.88

0.92

0.93

0.85

Though the AVE for deviance is slightly lower than preferred, the 0.50 threshold
is just a general recommendation, and the CR for deviance is well over the minimum
recommendation (Hair et al., 2010), so overall, deviance exhibits acceptable convergent
validity. Based on the factor loadings determined during CFA, the remaining items for
each construct were tested for convergent validity using the Average Variance Extracted
and Construct Reliability, and the results o f these tests support convergent validity in all
of the constructs.

Discriminant Validity
Discriminant validity, which is the “extent to which a construct is truly distinct
from other constructs”, is analyzed using the Squared Interconstruct Correlations, or SIC
(Hair et al. 2010, 771).

The SICs are compared to the Average Variance Extracted.

Discriminant validity is demonstrated when the AVE is higher than the corresponding
SICs since it shows that the construct explains its own item measures more than it
explains a different construct (Hair et al., 2010). The comparisons where the AVE is not
higher than the related SICs are shown in Table 15.
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Table 15

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Discriminant Validity: Average Variance Extracted &
Squared Interconstruct Correlation
A V E (B r e a c h )

S IC (B r e a c h & V io la tio n )

R a ise

0 .7 9

0 .8 2

B onus

0 .7 8

0.71

P r o m o tio n

0 .7 7

0 .8 3

J o b R e s p o n s ib ilitie s

0 .7 6

0 .7 3

J o b S e c u r ity

0.81

0 .8 2

C a r e e r D e v e lo p m e n t

0 .7 7

0 .7 8

Another way to test discriminant validity is to set the covariance between
psychological contract breach and feelings o f violation to one and observe how the fit
changes. Discriminant validity is demonstrated if the fit gets significantly worse with the
fixed covariance (Hair et al., 2010).

This test was done on the models for raises,

promotions, job security, and career development.

The fit o f the models with the

covariance set to one is almost the same as the fit when they are separate constructs.
These test results indicate that the two constructs may be measuring the same thing, so
another CFA was conducted with the items for psychological contract breach and feelings
of violation combined into one construct.

When this was done, the fit was actually

reduced for all four models, contrary to expectation. Though discriminant validity is low,
the analysis shows that psychological contract breach and feelings o f violation are best
left as separate constructs.
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Nomological Validity
To check for nomological validity, the correlations between constructs are
examined to see if they make sense. The correlations for each o f the six models are
shown in Table 16. A positive relationship between psychological contract breach and
feelings o f violation is hypothesized, so the positive correlation is expected.
Psychological contract breaches and feelings o f violation are anticipated to have a
negative relationship with performance, organizational citizenship behaviors, and job
satisfaction, which is evident in the negative correlations o f these constructs.

It also

posited that psychological contract breaches and feelings o f violation will have a positive
relationship with deviance. The positive correlation between these constructs is in line
with this prediction.

Since performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and job

satisfaction are all desirable outcomes, it makes sense that these constructs are positively
correlated with each other.

Similarly, because deviance is a damaging outcome, it

follows that deviance will be negatively correlated with the positive outcomes of
performance, organizational citizenship behaviors, and job satisfaction.
validity is demonstrated or all models in Table 16.

Nomological
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Table 16

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Nomological Validity: Correlations by Psychological
Contract Breach
Raise

Bonus

Promotion

Job
Responsibilities

Job Security

Career
Deselopment

Breach-Yiolation

0.904***

0.843***

0.910***

0.855***

0.903***

0.884***

Breach-Performance

-0.163***

-0.151***

-0.126**

-0.212***

-0.192***

-0.119**

Breach-OC'B

-0.309***

-0.332***

-0.368***

-0.343***

-0.348***

-0.388***

Breach-Satisfaction

-0.412***

-0.499***

-0.491***

-0.544***

-0.588***

-0.593***

0105**

0.111**

0.151***

0.138***

0.122**

0.142***

Yiolation-Performance

-0.173***

-0.178***

-0.142***

-0.288***

-0.234***

-0.206***

Breach-Deviance

Yiolalion-OCB

-0 315***

-0.311***

-0.360***

-0.373***

-0.348***

-0.387***

Yiolation-Satisfaction

-0.455***

-0.530***

-0.507***

-0.569***

-0.594***

-0.571***

Yiolation-Deviance

0.194***

0.148***

0.163***

0.187***

0.153***

0.161***

Performance-OCB

0.366***

0.366***

0.365***

0.366***

0.366***

0.366***

0.077

0.077

0.078

0.078

0.077

0.078

Performance-Satisfaction
Performance-Deviance

-0.297***

-0.297***

-0.297***

-0.297***

-0.297***

-0.297***

OCB-Satisfaction

0.494***

0.493***

0.494***

0.494***

0.494***

0.494***

OCB-Deviance

-0.348***

-0.348***

-0.348***

-0.348***

-0.348***

-0.348***

-0.165***

-0 165***

-0 165***

-0.165***

Satisfaction-Deviance

-0 165***

-0.165***

***S ign ifican t at p=0.01
**S ign ifican t at p -0.05
* Significant at p = 0 .10

Face Validity
Face validity refers to the consistency o f the content o f the items with the
definition o f the construct (Hair et al., 2010). All o f the psychological contract breach
items refer to promises made and broken by the employer, and the items in the feelings of
violation scale refer to feelings such as anger, betrayal, and frustration (Robinson &
Morrison, 2000).

The items from Williams and Anderson's (1991) employee

performance scale pertain to the duties, responsibilities, and requirements o f an
employee’s job.

The items on the organizational citizenship behavior scale include

statements about pride and loyalty (Lee & Allen, 2002). The scale for jo b satisfaction
contains adjectives that are indicative o f satisfaction (Russell et al., 2004), and twelve
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organizationally deviant acts o f varying severity make up the organizational deviance
scale (Bennett & Robinson, 2000).

The organizational justice scale items refer to

outcomes, processes, and treatment that affect employees (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009).
Since the meanings of the items are consistent with the construct definitions, face validity
is established.
S tr u c tu r a l E q u a tio n s M o d e l

The factor loadings from the CFA were compared to the factor loadings from
SEM. There were not any substantial changes between the loadings, as expected. An
examination o f the standardized residual covariances and the modification indices
suggested a closer look at the relationships between deviance, OCB, performance, and
job satisfaction may be necessary.

However, the suggested additional paths are not

consistent with theory and were not added to the models.

The fit o f the Structural

Equations Models is good and meets the recommended guidelines o f having RMSEA of
0.08 or below (Hair et al., 2010). Another recommendation is to have CFI o f 0.92 or
above (Hair et al., 2010), which is met or is very nearly met in all o f the models, shown
in Table 17.
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Table 17
SEM Fit Indices: Root Mean Square Error o f Approximation & Comparative Fit Index

R M SE A

CFI

R aise

0.055

0.919

Bonus

0.055

0.920

P ro m o tio n

0.054

0.920

J o b R esponsibilities

0.056

0.912

J o b S ecu rity

0.055

0.921

C a re e r D evelopm en t

0.054

0.919

Hypothesis 3 Results
Descriptive statistics for the individual psychological contract breach and the
associated feelings o f violation are displayed in Table 18, which shows the average score
for psychological contract breach and feelings o f violation. Both were scored on a scale
o f one to five. The psychological contracts o f promotion and career development have
the highest score for psychological contract breach, while job security has the lowest
score. Promotion and job security also had the highest and lowest feelings o f violation
score, respectively.
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Table 18
Descriptive Statistics fo r Psychological Contract Breaches and Feelings o f Violation
M e an B rea ch
S core
(1.00-5.00)

S ta n d a rd
D eviation

M ean F eelin g s o f
V io latio n S core
(1.00-5.00)

S ta n d a rd
D ev iatio n

R aise

2.60

1.03

2.41

1.12

B onus

2.62

1.00

2.37

1.09

P ro m o tio n

2.68

1.00

2.43

1.09

J o b R esp o n sib ilities

2.44

0.95

2.26

1.03

Jo b S e c u rity

2.41

1.05

2.24

1.11

C a r e e r D evelopm ent

2.68

0.99

2.40

1.08

Hypothesis three states that there is a positive relationship between a breach in
psychological contract and feelings o f violation for transactional and relational
psychological contract breaches. This relationship is positive and significant for all six
psychological contract breaches, as seen in Table 19. Hypothesis 3a and 3b are supported.

Table 19
Psychological Contract Breach to Feelings o f Violation: Expected Sign and Standardized
Regression Weight
E x p ected Sign
R aise

Stdz. R eg ressio n W eight
0.901***

B onus

-

0.841***

P ro m o tio n

-

0.915***

J o b R esponsibilities

0.853***

J o b S ecu rity

-

0.908***

C a re e r D evelopm ent

-

0.887***

* * * S ig n if ic a n t a t p = 0 .0 1
* * S ig n if ic a n t a t p -0 .0 5
^ S ig n if ic a n t a t p = 0 . 10
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Hypothesis 4 Results
The fourth hypothesis states that the relationships between feelings o f violation
and employee performance (4a), OCB (4b), and job satisfaction (4c) are all negative,
while the relationship between feelings o f violation and organizational deviance (4d) is
positive. Table 20 shows that for four o f the six psychological contract breach models,
the relationship between feelings o f violation and employee performance are negative
and significant, as predicted.
Table 21 displays the results for Hypothesis 4b. Five o f the six psychological
contract breach models show a significant and negative relationship between feelings of
violation and organizational citizenship behavior.

Hypotheses 4a and 4b are partially

supported.

Table 20
Feelings o f Violation to Employee Performance: Expected Sign and Standardized
Regression Weight
E x p e c te d Sign

Stdz. R e g re ssio n W eig h t

R aise

-

-0.204

B onus

-

-0.185*

P ro m o tio n

-

-0.210

J o b R esp o n sib ilities

-

-0.429***

J o b S e c u rity

-

-0.322***

C a r e e r D ev e lo p m e n t

-

-0.465***

* **S igniflcant at p=0.01
**S ignificant at p-0.05
*S ignificant at p = 0 .10
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Table 21

Feelings of Violation to Organizational Citizenship Behaviors: Expected Sign and
Standardized Regression Weight
E x p ec ted S ign

S td z. R e g re ssio n W e ig h t

R aise

-

-0.290**

B onus

-

-0.116

P ro m o tio n

-

-0.228*

J o b R esp o n sib ilities

-

-0.339***

J o b S e c u rity

-

-0.216*

C a r e e r D ev e lo p m e n t

-

-0.225**

* * * S ignificant at p=0.01
* * S ignificant at p-0.05
*S ignificant at p = 0 .1 0

The relationship between the feelings o f violation for raises, bonuses, promotions,
job responsibilities, job security, career development and job satisfaction are negative and
significant as predicted, in support o f H4c.

When feelings o f violation increase, job

satisfaction decreases. The results are shown in Table 22.
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Table 22

Feelings o f Violation to Job Satisfaction: Expected Sign and Standardized Regression
Weight
E x p ec ted S ign

S td z. R e g re ssio n W e ig h t

R aise

-

-0.497***

B onus

-

-0.364***

P ro m o tio n

-

-0.343***

J o b R e sp o n sib ilities

-

-0.388***

J o b S e c u rity

-

-0.358***

C a r e e r D ev e lo p m e n t

-

-0.225**

***Significant at p=0.01
**Significant at p-0.05
*Significant at p=0.10

The relationship between feelings o f violation and organizational deviance is
significant and positive for four o f the six psychological contract breach models, as
expected.

This means that as feelings o f violation increase, organizational deviance

significantly increases for raises, bonuses, job responsibilities, and job security.
Hypothesis 4d is partially supported, and the results are displayed in Table 23.

105
Table 23

Feelings of Violation to Organizational Deviance: Expected Sign and Standardized
Regression Weight
E x p ec ted Sign

S td z. R e g re ssio n W eig h t

R aise

-

0.570***

B onus

-

0.199**

P ro m o tio n

*

0.209

J o b R esp o n sib ilities

0.326***

J o b S e c u rity

-

0.218*

C a r e e r D ev e lo p m e n t

-

0.164

***S ig n ifican t at p=0.01
■"♦Significant at p-0.05
♦S ignificant at p = 0 .10

Hypothesis 5 Results
The indirect effects and residual direct effects are used to determine whether
mediation is present. The indirect effect is the product o f the path from psychological
contract breach to feelings o f violation and feelings o f violation to employee
performance, for example. The residual direct effect is the path between psychological
contract breach and employee performance when feelings o f violation are included as a
mediator (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). One way to formally test for indirect effects is to
use bootstrapping to determine the significance o f this effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).
The percentile confidence intervals method o f bootstrapping was used with a 90%
confidence level. If the interval includes zero, it indicates that no mediation is present. It
took 13 iterations for the breach o f raises model, 14 for the breach o f bonuses model, and
12 iterations for the rest o f the models. When the indirect effect is significant and the
direct effect is not, full mediation is said to have occurred. When the indirect effect and
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the direct effect are both significant, partial mediation is present. The results are shown
for each psychological contract breach in Tables 24, 25, 26, and 27.

Table 24
Mediation Results fo r Feelings o f Violation on Psychological Contract Breach &
Employee Performance Relationship: Significance o f Standardized Indirect Effect,
Standardized Regression Weight and Significance o f Residual Direct Relationship
Indirect Effect
(p-value)

R esidual D irect Effect
(Stdz. R egression Weight)

Residual D irect Effect
(p-value)

M ediation

Raise

0.248

0.027

0.832

None

Bonus

0.098

-

0.001

0.989

Full

Prom otion

0.169

0.070

0.613

None

Jo b Responsibilities

0.010

0.144

0.152

Full

Jo b Security

0.037

0.086

0.493

Full

C a re e r D evelopment

0.010

0.288

0.013

Partial

Table 25
Mediation Results fo r Feelings o f Violation on Psychological Contract Breach &
Organizational Citizenship Behavior Relationship: Significance o f Standardized Indirect
Effect, Standardized Regression Weight and Significance o f Residual Direct Relationship
Indirect Effect
(p-value)

Residual D irect Effect
(Stdz. Regression W eight)

Residual D irect Effect
(p-value)

M ediation

Raise

0.112

-0.020

0.866

None

Bonus

0.236

-0.035

0.008

None

Prom otion

0.119

-0.136

0.283

None

Jo b Responsibilities

0.010

-0.055

0,559

Full

Jo b Security

0.089

-0.150

0.196

Full

C areer Development

0.096

-0.181

0.086

Partial
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Table 26
Mediation Results fo r Feelings o f Violation on Psychological Contract Breach & Job
Satisfaction Relationship: Significance o f Standardized Indirect Effect, Standardized
Regression Weight and Significance o f Residual Direct Relationship
in d ire ct Effect
(p-value)

Residual D irect Effect
(Stdz. R egression W eight)

R esidual D irect Effect
(p-value)

M ediation

Raise

0.010

0.041

0.722

Full

Bonus

0.010

-0.193

0.016

Partial

Prom otion

0.010

-0.180

0.132

Full

J o b Responsibilities

0.010

-0.206

0.016

Partial

Jo b Security

0.010

-0.252

0.015

Partial

C are er Development

0.085

-0.388

0.000

Partial

Table 27
Mediation Results fo r Feelings o f Violation on Psychological Contract Breach &
Organizational Deviance Relationship: Significance o f Standardized Indirect Effect,
Standardized Regression Weight and Significance o f Residual Direct Relationship
Indirect Effect
(p-value)

Residual D irect Effect
(Stdz. R egression Weight)

R esidual D irect Effect
(p-value)

M ediation

Raise

0.010

-0.419

0.001

Partial

Bonus

0.122

-0.053

0.577

None

Prom otion

0.225

-0.045

0.744

None

Jo b Responsibilities

0.010

-0.128

0.215

Full

Jo b Security

0.084

-0.047

0.711

Full

C areer Development

0.194

0.008

0.945

None

Hypothesis 5 predicts the relationship between psychological contract breach and
employee performance (5a), OCB (5b), job satisfaction (5c), and organizational deviance
(5d) will be mediated by feelings o f violation. Feelings o f violation fully mediate the
relationship between a psychological contract breach o f bonuses, job responsibilities, and
job security and employee performance. Feelings o f violation also partially mediate the
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relationship between a psychological contract breach o f career development and
employee performance. Because mediation is present in four o f the six psychological
contract breach models, hypothesis 5a is partially supported.
Hypothesis 5b predicts that feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and organizational citizenship behavior.

Feelings o f

violation fully mediate this relationship for job responsibilities and job security, and
partially mediate this relationship for career development.

Hypothesis 5b is partially

supported, as feelings o f violation did not mediate the relationship between any o f the
transactional psychological contract breaches and organizational citizenship behavior.
Feelings o f violation significantly mediate the relationship between all o f the
psychological contract breaches and job satisfaction, in support o f hypothesis 5c.
Feelings o f violation fully mediate the relationship for raises and promotions, while
feelings o f violation partially mediate the relationship for bonuses, job responsibilities,
job security, and career development.
Hypothesis 5d predicts a mediating role for feelings o f violation in the
relationship between psychological contract breaches and organizational deviance.
Feelings o f violation fully mediate the relationship between a breach in job
responsibilities and job security and organizational deviance.

Feelings o f violation

partially mediate the relationship between a psychological contract breach in raises and
organizational deviance. Hypothesis 5d is partially supported, as feelings o f violation
serve as a mediator in three of the six psychological contract breach models.
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Hypothesis 6 Results
Organizational justice was tested as a moderator in the relationship between a
psychological contract breach and feelings o f violation.

To do this, the sample was

divided into thirds based on the average score on organizational justice scale.

The

bottom third was used as the low justice sample (n=164), and the highest third was used
as the high justice sample (n-164).

The difference in the relationship between

psychological contract breach and feelings o f violation for the high and low justice
groups was compared using multiple group analysis. Justice has a significant moderating
effect on this relationship for a breach o f raises, promotions, job security, and career
development. When justice is high, the relationship between a psychological contract
breach and feelings o f violation is reduced compared to when justice is low, as expected.
The strength o f the relationship between a psychological contract breach and feelings of
violation is lower when high justice is present for bonuses and job responsibilities as
well, though the difference is not significant, shown in Table 28.
Hypothesis 6 is partially supported.
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Table 28
Moderation Results: Difference in Unstandardized Regression Weights o f Psychological
Contract Breach to Feelings o f Violation by Low & High Justice
B r e a c h - - V io la tio n
(L o w J u s t ic e )

B r e a c h — V io la tio n
(H ig h J u s t ic e )

R a is e

1.029

0.821

0 .2 0 8 * *

B onus

0 .8 8 4

0 .8 8 0

0 .0 0 4

P r o m o tio n

1.037

0.781

0 .2 5 6 * * *

J o b R e s p o n s ib ilitie s

0 .8 0 4

0 .9 11

J o b S e c u r ity

1.016

0 .6 7 8

0 .3 3 8 * * *

C a r e e r D e v e lo p m e n t

0 .9 6 9

0 .7 1 8

0 .2 5 1 * *

D if fe re n c e

-0 .1 0 7

♦ ♦ ♦ S ig n ific a n t a t p = 0 .0 1
^ ♦ S ig n ific a n t at p -0 .0 5
♦ S ig n ific a n t at p = 0 .1 0

ANOVA
The participants were asked to which employment status group they belonged:
Voluntary Stayers/Group 1 (282 participants), Involuntary Stayers/Group 2 (84),
Voluntary Leavers/Group 3 (79), and Involuntary Leavers/Group 4 (48). Hypothesis 7
states that those who have stayed with the company involuntary or left voluntarily have
experienced more psychological contract breaches (H7a), more severe psychological
contract breaches (H7b), and stronger feelings o f violation (H7c) those who have stayed
voluntarily or left involuntarily.
For H7a, frequency is calculated as the number o f psychological contract breach
averages that are 3.5 or over, similar to Hypothesis 1. However, for Hypothesis 7, the
highest possible score for the total number o f psychological contract breaches is six,
versus three in Hypothesis 1. For H7b, the severity o f psychological contract breaches is
calculated as the average breach score from the 5-point Likert-type scale, resulting in a
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range from one to five. For H7c, the severity o f feelings o f violation is tested using only
the respondents who experienced at least one transactional and one relational
psychological contract breach like H2. The feelings o f violation scores associated with
the breaches actually experienced were used to calculate the severity o f feelings o f
violation. The range for severity o f feelings o f violation is one to 5, since the feelings o f
violation were scored on a 5-point Likert-type scale.
To test Hypothesis 7, three, one-way ANOVAs are conducted. The assumptions
o f concern are normality and homogeneity o f variance. The Kolmogorov-Smimov test o f
normality indicates that normality is significantly violated in all groups for the frequency
o f psychological contract breaches. However, the central limit theorem states that the
sampling distribution tends to be normal in samples o f 30 or more, regardless o f the
shape o f the collected data (Field, 2009), and all employment status groups have at least
48 observations.

Also, theory indicates that the frequency o f psychological contract

breaches should be much lower for Voluntary Stayers. As such, many responses are on
the low end, violating a normal distribution. Because the normality is in line with the
theory, these results for normality are not expected to alter interpretation o f ANOVA
results.
Normality is also significantly violated for the severity o f psychological contract
breaches, but only for Voluntary Stayers/Group 1. Again, this follows the theory that this
group should experience less severe psychological contract breaches and feelings o f
violation.

Additionally, the group o f Voluntary Stayers is the largest, well above the

point at which a sample is considered large enough to assume the sampling distribution is
normal (Field, 2009). Normality was not violated for the severity o f feelings o f feelings
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for any o f the employment status groups.

For these reasons, all ANOVA results are

interpreted as usual.
Levene’s test o f homogeneity o f variance indicates that the frequency o f
psychological contract breaches and the severity o f psychological contract breaches for
all groups are significantly violated at p<0.05. Homogeneity o f variance is not violated
for the severity o f feelings o f violation. Post-hoc tests that do not assume equal variances
are used to test for differences between groups. Specifically, the Games-Howell post hoc
test was used because it was not only designed to be used when there are unequal
variances, but it is also accurate when the sample sizes are unequal, which is the case for
the employment status groups (Field, 2009).

Hypothesis 7 Results
The ANOVA results in Table 29 suggest that there are significant (p<0.001)
differences among the employment status groups in the frequency and severity of
psychological contract breaches, but not the severity o f feelings o f violation (p=0.176).

Table 29
ANOVA Results: Means by Employment Group
F re q u e n c y o f
B re a c h

S e v e rity o f
B re a c h

S e v e rity o f
V io la tio n

(0.00-6.00)

( 1.00-5.00)

( 1.00-5.00)

V o lu n ta ry S ta y e rs

0.7 0

2.28

3.69

I n v o lu n ta ry S ta y e rs

2.26

3.08

3.91

V o lu n ta ry L e a v e rs

1.75

2.85

4.01

I n v o lu n ta r y L e a v e rs

1.94

2.96

4.03
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The frequency and severity o f psychological contract breaches o f violation for
Involuntary Stayers/Group 2 are significantly different from the other groups. The rest o f
the differences are not significant.
Hypothesis 7a states that the frequency o f psychological contract breaches will be
higher for Involuntary Stayers and Voluntary Leavers.

The frequency o f breaches is

significantly higher for Involuntary Stayers, though the frequency for Voluntary Leavers
is not significantly different from Voluntary Stayers and Involuntary Leavers.
Hypothesis 7a is partially supported. The severity o f psychological contract breaches
was predicted to be higher for Involuntary Stayers and Voluntary Leavers in Hypothesis
7b. The severity is significantly higher for Involuntary Stayers, but not for Voluntary
Leavers. Hypothesis 7b is partially supported. Hypothesis 7c posits that the severity o f
feelings of violation is higher for Involuntary Stayers and Voluntary Leavers. There were
no significant differences in the severity o f feelings o f violation between the employment
status groups. Therefore, Hypothesis 7c is not supported.

Supplemental Analysis
Four additional ANOVAs were conducted to explore the differences in the
dependent variables o f employee performance, OCB, job satisfaction, and organizational
deviance, by employment status group. Normality and homogeneity o f variance were
also assessed for the supplementary tests. Normality and homogeneity o f variance o f the
employment status groups by dependent variable were very similar to the results for
Hypothesis 7. Normality is violated, but again, the smallest group has 48 participants,
which is considered a sufficiently large sample to assume a normal distribution according
to the central limit theorem (Field, 2009). The assumption o f homogeneity o f variance is
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also violated, so the Games-Howell post hoc test for differences was used since it works
for samples with unequal variance and for unequal group sizes (Field, 2009).
The ANOVAs revealed that there are significant differences among the
employment status groups (Voluntary Stayers, Involuntary Stayers, Voluntary Leavers,
and Involuntary Leavers) for organizational citizenship behavior (p=0.000) and job
satisfaction (p=0.000), but not for employee performance or organizational deviance.
The results for OCB and job satisfaction can be seen in Table 30.

Organizational

citizenship behavior was measured on a scale o f one to seven, and job satisfaction was
measured on a scale o f zero to three. Voluntary Stayers have significantly higher OCB
and job satisfaction than Involuntary Stayers, Voluntary Leavers, and Involuntary
Leavers.

While it is interesting to note that employees who left the company had

significantly lower organizational citizenship behavior and job satisfaction, the results for
Involuntary Stayers should be o f great interest to those in industry.

These are the

employees that are still with the organization, even though they do not want to be. Their
low organizational citizenship behaviors and job satisfaction can negatively affect the
success o f a merger or acquisition.

Table 30
Mean Scores on Organizational Citizenship Behavior and Job Satisfaction Scales by
Employment Group Status
OCB

Job Satisfaction

V oluntary Stayers

5.200

2.362

Involuntary Stayers

4.252

0.950

V oluntary Leavers

4.217

1.390

Involuntary L eavers

4.281

0.932

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings
The results show that during mergers and acquisitions, more transactional
psychological contract breaches are perceived by employees than relational psychological
contract breaches, as expected. Contrary to the hypothesis based on a theory proposed by
Morrison and Robinson (1997), the severity o f feelings o f violation from relational
psychological contract breaches was not worse than the severity feelings o f violation o f
transactional psychological contract breaches. Although the feelings o f violation from
relational psychological contract breaches are less severe, they play more o f a mediating
role in the severity o f the outcomes (employee performance, organizational citizenship
behavior, job satisfaction, and organizational deviance). In summary, participants
perceived transactional breaches more often and more severely than relational breaches.
Breaches o f both transactional and relational psychological contracts lead to
feelings o f violation, which then affect employee performance, organizational citizenship
behavior, job satisfaction, and organizational deviance. Feelings o f violation mediate the
relationship between the psychological contract breaches o f bonuses, job responsibilities,
job security, and career development and employee performance. Feelings o f violation
also mediate the relationship between the breaches o f job responsibilities, job security,
and career development, and organizational citizenship behavior. The relationship
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between

psychological

contract

breaches

o f raises,

bonuses,

promotions, job

responsibilities, job security, and career development and job satisfaction is mediated by
feelings o f violation.

Similarly, feelings o f violation also mediate the relationship

between the breaches o f raises, job responsibilities, and job security and organizational
deviance. Feelings o f violation do play a role in how severe the effects o f psychological
contract breaches are on employee performance, organizational citizenship behavior, job
satisfaction, and organizational deviance. Organizational justice was shown to reduce the
feelings o f violation associated with a psychological contract breach o f raises,
promotions, job security, and career development. However, organizational justice did
not significantly mitigate the feelings o f violation from a breach o f bonuses or job
responsibilities.
Employees who stayed with the organization involuntarily and those who left the
organization voluntarily, perceived psychological contract breaches more frequently and
more severely than those who remained with the organization voluntarily.

The

Involuntary Stayers and Voluntary Leavers also experienced more severe feelings o f
violation than Voluntary Stayers. Involuntary Leavers did not experience significantly
less frequent breaches, less severe breaches, or less severe feelings o f violation, as
expected. Table 31 summarizes the results. Additional analyses show that organizational
citizenship behavior and job satisfaction are significantly higher for Voluntary Stayers
than Involuntary Stayers, Voluntary Leavers, and Involuntary Leavers.
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Table 31
Hypothesis Results Summary
H I : M o re tra n s a c tio n a l th a n re la tio n a l b re a c h e s
T a b le 10
Supported
H 2: M o re se v ere feelings o f v io latio n fro m re la tio n a l th a n tra n s a c tio n a l b re a c h e s
N ot Supported
H 3 a: P ositive re la tio n sh ip b etw een tra n s a c tio n a l b re a c h a n d feelings o f v io latio n (T a b le 20)
Raise

Supported

Bonus

Supported

Prom otion

Supported

H 3b: P ositive re la tio n sh ip b etw e en re la tio n a l b re a c h a n d feelings o f v io latio n (T a b le 20)
Job R esponsibilities

Supported

Job Security

Supported

C areer D evelopm ent

Supported

H 4 a: N egative re la tio n sh ip b etw een feelings o f v io latio n a n d p e rfo rm a n c e (T a b le 20)
Raise (Transactional)

N ot Supported

Bonus (Transactional)

Supported

Prom otion (Transactional)

N ot Supported

Job Responsibilities (R elational)

Supported

Job Security (R elational)

Supported

C areer D evelopm ent (R elational)

Supported

H 4b: N egative re la tio n sh ip b etw een feelings o f v io latio n a n d O C B (
T a b le 2 1 )
Raise (Transactional)

Supported

Bonus (Transactional)

N ot Supported

Prom otion (Transactional)

Supported

Job Responsibilities (R elational)

Supported

Job Security (R elational)

Supported

C areer D evelopm ent (R elational)

Supported

H 4c: N egative re la tio n sh ip b etw een feelings o f v io latio n a n d jo b sa tisfa c tio n (
T a b le 2 2 )
Raise (Transactional)

Supported

Bonus (Transactional)

Supported

Prom otion (Transactional)

Supported

Job R esponsibilities (R elational)

Supported

Job Security (R elational)

Supported

C areer D evelopm ent (R elational)

Supported

H 4d: P ositive re la tio n sh ip b etw een feelings o f v io latio n a n d d ev ian c e sh o w n in T a b le 23
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Table 31 (Continued)
Raise (Transactional)

Supported

Bonus (Transactional)

Supported

Prom otion (Transactional)

N ot Supported

Job R esponsibilities (R elational)

Supported

Job Security (R elational)

Supported

C areer D evelopm ent (R elational)

N ot Supported

H 5 a: Feelings o f vio latio n m ed iates re la tio n sh ip betw een b re a c h a n d p e rfo rm a n c e (T a b le 24)
Raise (Transactional)

N ot Supported

Bonus (Transactional)

Supported

Prom otion (Transactional)

N ot Supported

Job R esponsibilities (R elational)

Supported

Job Security (R elational)

Supported

C areer D evelopm ent (R elational)

Supported

H 5b: F eelings o f vio latio n m e d iates re la tio n sh ip betw een b re a c h a n d O C B (T a b le 25)
Raise (Transactional)

N ot Supported

Bonus (Transactional)

N ot Supported

Prom otion (Transactional)

N ot Supported

Job R esponsibilities (R elational)

Supported

Job Security (R elational)

Supported

C areer D evelopm ent (R elational)

Supported

H 5c: F eelings o f vio latio n m e d iates re la tio n sh ip betw een b re a c h a n d jo b sa tisfac tio n (T a b le 26)
Raise (Transactional)

Supported

Bonus (Transactional)

Supported

Prom otion (Transactional)

Supported

Job R esponsibilities (R elational)

Supported

Job Security (R elational)

Supported

C areer D evelopm ent (R elational)

Supported

H 5d: F eelings o f vio latio n m e d iates re la tio n sh ip betw een b re a c h a n d d ev ian c e (T a b le 27)
Raise (Transactional)

Supported

Bonus (Transactional)

N o t Supported

Prom otion (Transactional)

N ot Supported

Job R esponsibilities (R elational)

Supported

Job Security (R elational)

Supported

C areer D evelopm ent (R elational)

N ot Supported
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Table 31 (Continued)
H 6: J u s tic e m o d e ra te s re la tio n sh ip betw een b re a c h a n d feelings o f v io latio n (T a b le 28)
Raise

Supported

Bonus

N ot Supported

Prom otion

Supported

Job R esponsibilities

N ot Supported

Job Security

Supported

C areer D evelopm ent

Supported

H 7 a: M o re b re a c h e s fo r V L a n d IS th a n IL a n d V S (T a b le 29)
Partially Supported
H 7b: M o re se v ere b re a c h e s fo r V L a n d IS th a n IL a n d V S (T a b le 29)
Partially Supported
H 7c: M o re se v ere vio latio n fo r V L a n d IS th a n IL a n d V S (T a b le 29)
N ot Supported

Implications of the Findings
The findings suggest that employees perceive breaches in the psychological
contract pertaining to raises, bonuses, and promotions more frequently than job
responsibilities, job security, and career development.

Not only do the employees

perceive these breaches more often, but the feelings o f violation are more severe. The
results suggest that these elements matter more to employees. This information is useful
to organizations going through a merger or acquisition.

While change is inevitable

during M&As, employers should make it a higher priority to honor the transactional
elements o f the employees’ jobs, versus the more relational aspects o f the job.
Psychological contract breaches lead to feelings o f violation, which then leads to
reduced employee performance, organizational citizenship behaviors, job satisfaction,
and increased organizational deviance. Feelings o f violation from a psychological
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contract breach o f pay raises significantly effects, in descending order, organizational
deviance, job

satisfaction,

organizational

citizenship

behaviors,

then

employee

performance. A summary o f the SEM results can be seen in Table 32.

Table 32
Summary o f Standardized Regression Weights by Psychological Contract Breach

Violation-Perform ancc
Violation-OCB
Violation-Satisfaction
Violation-Deviance

-0.204

-0.185*

-0.210

-0.429***

-0.322***

-0.465*“

-0.200“

-0.116

-0.228*

-0.339*“

-0.216*

41.225**

-0.497*“

-0.364***

-0.343***

-0.388***

-0.358***

-0 22S**

0.199“

0.209

0.326***

Jo b Security

C areer
Development

Bonus

0.570“ *

Promotion

Jo b
Responsibilities

Raise

0.218*

0.164

‘ “ Significant at p=0.01
‘ ‘ Significant at p-0.05
‘ Significant at p=0.10

A formal test was conducted to determine if these size effects are significantly
different from each other, and the results from the size effect tests can be seen in Table
33.
For raises, feelings o f violation most affect organizational deviance (0.570),
followed by job satisfaction (-0.497), organizational citizenship behavior (0.290), and
employee performance (-0.204). The results in Table 34 show that even though the effect
o f feelings o f violation on organizational citizenship behavior (-0.290) is larger than the
effect on employee performance (-0.024), this difference is not significant. However, all
other size differences are significant for raises.
The results vary among the different psychological contract breaches.

For

example, feelings of violation from a breach in the psychological contract pertaining to
job responsibilities has significant effects, in descending order, on employee performance
(-0.429), job satisfaction (-0.388), organizational citizenship behavior (-0.339), then
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organizational deviance (0.326). As seen in Table 33, the difference between employee
performance, job satisfaction, and OCB are not significantly different from each other.
However, the effects o f organizational deviance are significantly different (lower) than
employee performance, job satisfaction, and OCB. It is important to remember that all o f
the effects from feelings o f violation associated with a psychological contract breach in
job responsibilities are statistically significant, but they are not significantly different
from each other. Models for raises and job responsibilities can be seen in Figure 3 and
Figure 4. The results for the other psychological contract breaches can be seen in Table
33.
The size effects are unique to each psychological contract breach, which provides
evidence that each psychological contract breach should be considered separately and
that combining them into an overall psychological contract would lead to a loss o f
information.
Employee Perform ance

O rganizational Citizenship
Psychological C ontract
Breach in Raises

0.901

Feelings o f Violation
from Breach in
Raises

Job Satisfaction

O rganizational Deviance

Figure 3 SEM Model fo r a Psychological Contract Breach o f Raises
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Employee Perform ance

O rganizational Citizenship
Psychological C ontract
Breach in Job

Feelings of Violation
0.853

Responsibilities

from Breach in Job
Responsibilities

Job Satisfaction

O reanizational Deviance

Figure 4 SEM Model fo r a Psychological Contract Breach o f Job Responsibilities

Table 33
Size Effects: Differences in Standardized Regression Weights within Each Psychological
Contract Breach Model

Raise
Pcrform anceOCB

0.0X6

Pcrform anccSatisfaction

Bonus

Promotion

Job
Responsibilities

Job Security

Career
Developm ent

-0.069

0.019

-0.090

-0.106

-0.240**

0.292**

0.179

0.134

-0,040

0.036

-0.240

Pcrform anccDeviance

-0.775**

-0.384*

-0.41 X

O CBSatisfaction

0.207**

OC’B-Dcviancc

-0.X60**

SatisfactionDeviance

1.067**

0.249***

0.115

-0.755**
0.050

-0.540**

-0.629**

0.142*

0.000

-0.315

-0.437*

-0.665**

-0.434*

-0.3X9

-0.563***

-0.552*

-0.714**

-0.576***

-0.3X9*

’ ’ ’ Significant at p=0.01
’ ♦Significant at p-0.05
’ Significant at p = 0 .10

The mediating role o f feelings o f violation suggests that performance, OCBs, job
satisfaction, and deviance are impacted more by employees who experience stronger
feelings o f violation. Feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between relational
psychological contract breaches more often than transactional psychological contract
breaches.

This is unsurprising since employees are likely to be more emotionally

invested in relational psychological contracts, while transactional psychological contracts
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are more objective.

The moderating role o f organizational justice suggests that

companies that want to reduce the effects o f feelings o f violation experienced by their
employees should attempt to make the outcome o f decisions, the decision-making process
itself, and the communication o f such decisions to be perceived as fairly as possible by
employees.
The results also reveal that employees who remain with the organization
voluntarily perceive psychological contract breaches less frequently and less severely.
They also experience weaker feelings o f violation than employees who stay with the
organization involuntary or who leave the company, whether the decision is voluntary o f
involuntary. While companies may not be as concerned about the effects o f employees
who leave the organization on a merger and acquisition, there are many employees who
stay with the organization because they feel they have no other choice (about 17% in this
study).

This group o f employees should not be ignored, as they are more likely to

perceive psychological contract breaches and feelings o f violation.

Also, additional

analysis showed that Involuntary Stayers, along with Involuntary and Voluntary Leavers,
report significantly lower organizational citizenship behavior and job satisfaction. This
should be o f great interest to companies since these employees are in a position to
negatively affect the company during a merger or acquisition.

Limitations of the Research
Since anyone over 18 can sign up for Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, it was
necessary to use several techniques to ensure quality data. Each respondent was required
to have a 97% accuracy rating, meaning that they have successfully completed 97% o f
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the Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) attempted.

They were also required to have

completed at least 50 HITs and have a registered address in the United States.
A possible concern o f self-reported data is social desirability bias.

Social

desirability is “a need for social approval and acceptance and the belief that this can be
attained by means o f culturally acceptable and appropriate behaviors” (Marlowe and
Crowne 1964, 109). If a respondent in this study made themselves appear more socially
desirable, it would bias the data against the hypotheses. Therefore, based on the results,
social desirability should not be a concern in the present study.
A limitation o f this study is the low discriminant validity between psychological
contract breach and feelings o f violation. When these two constructs are combined into
one construct, the fit is reduced. While better discriminant validity would be ideal, the
best choice for this study is to leave them as separate constructs.

Contributions of the Research
This study adds to the limited research in accounting on psychological contracts,
despite their prominence in the workplace.

Smith (1993), Martin (1995), Schofield

(1996), Mac Rory (1999), Bruce (2001), and Classe (2004) urge practitioners to realize
the importance o f employees’ psychological contracts. Bruce (2001) and Classe (2004)
comment on the significance o f psychological contracts during mergers and acquisitions.
This study empirically tests the comments made by Bruce (2001) and Classe (2004).
This study also adds to prior research by including feelings o f violation as a mediator,
which has not been done in a merger and acquisition setting. Also, organizational justice
is used as a moderator in the relationship between psychological contract breaches and
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feelings o f violation, which is another new application in the merger and acquisition
setting.
Contrary to prior studies that used samples from one or a few companies that
experienced mergers and acquisitions, this study utilizes an online survey.

This is

advantageous as it allows for respondents from a wide variety o f companies and
industries to be included in the sample, increasing external validity. Information about
employees who remain with the organization because they feel they have no other choice
is o f importance to employers since they are in a position to negatively affect the
company. An online survey offers more anonymity for Involuntary Stayers to provide
honest responses than previous studies that use face-to-face interviews or surveys
associated with a particular employer.

This data collection method also allows for

employees who are no longer with the organization to be included in the sample.

Suggestions for Future Research
Downsizing is often a major part o f mergers and acquisitions. However, many
companies experience downsizing separately from a merger or acquisition.

The

organizational changes involved in both situations are similar, but the reactions from
employees may differ. Future research can examine the similarities and differences in
psychological contract breaches and outcomes between companies who have merged or
been acquired and companies who have downsized.
In this research, the participants indicate their employment status from staying or
leaving, voluntarily or involuntarily. An extension o f the current study is to investigate
the differences in effects on employee performance, organizational citizenship behavior,
job satisfaction, and organizational deviance for voluntary and involuntary stayers and
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leavers. Further research can include other considerations o f employment status, such as
how attached employees are to their job.

Another consideration is why employees

choose to leave their job and what pressures they may face to leave the organization.

REFERENCES

Adams, J. S. (1965). ADV EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Volume 2
(Google eBook). In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology
(pp. 267-299). New York: Academic Press.
Al-Najjar, N. I., & Casadesus-Masanell, R. (2001). Trust and Discretion in Agency
Contracts. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssm.282758
Ambrose, M. L., & Schminke, M. (2009). The role o f overall justice judgments in
organizational justice research: A test o f mediation. Journal o f Applied Psychology,
94(2), 491-500. doi:10.1037/a0013203
Armenakis, A. A. (1999). Organizational Change: A Review o f Theory and Research in
the 1990s. Journal o f Management, 25(3), 293-315.
doi: 10.1177/014920639902500303
Asanuma, B. (1985). The Organization o f Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive
Industry. Japanese Economy, 13(4), 32-53. doi:10.2753/JES1097-203X130432
Asanuma, B. (1989). Manufacturer-supplier relationships in Japan and the concept o f
relation-specific skill. Journal o f the Japanese and International Economies, 3(1),
1-30.
Baiman, S., & Rajan, M. V. (2002a). Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27(3), 213-238.
Baiman, S., & Rajan, M. V. (2002b). The Role o f Information and Opportunism in the
Choice o f Buyer-Supplier Relationships. Journal o f Accounting Research, 40(2),
247-278. doi:10.1111/1475-679X.00046
Baldenius, T. (2000). Intrafirm Trade, Bargaining Power, and Specific Investments.
Review o f Accounting Studies, 5(1), 27-56. doi:10.1023/A:1009612901910
Baldenius, T., Reichelstein, S., & Sahay, S. A. (1999). Negotiated versus Cost-Based
Transfer Pricing. Review o f Accounting Studies, 4(2), 67-91.
doi: 10.1023/A: 100963 8001487

127

128
Bellou, V. (2007). Psychological contract assessment after a major organizational
change: The case of mergers and acquisitions. Employee Relations, 29( 1), 68-88.
doi: 10.1108/01425450710714487
Bennett, R. J., & Robinson, S. L. (2000). Development o f a measure o f workplace
deviance. Journal o f Applied Psychology, 85(3), 349-360. doi: 10.103 7/00219010.85.3.349
Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley.
Bligh, M. C., & Carsten, M. K. (2005). Post-merger psychological contracts: exploring a
“multiple foci” conceptualization. Employee Relations, 27(5), 495-510.
doi: 10.1108/01425450510612022
Boyle, D. M., Carpenter, B. W., & Mahoney, D. (2012). Goodwill Accounting: A Closer
Examination o f the Matter o f Nonimpairments. Management Accounting Quarterly,
13(4), 10-19.
Bradach, J., & Eccles, R. (1989). Price, authority, and trust: From ideal types to plural
forms. Annual Review o f Sociology, 75(1989), 97-118.
Brehm, J. W. (1966). A theory o f psychological reactance. New York (p. 135). Academic
Press.
Brehm, S. S., & Brehm, J. W. (1981). Psychological reactance: A theory o f freedom and
control. New York: Academic Press.
Brigg, J. S. (2001). Doctoral Thesis. Manchester Metropolitan University.
Bruce, R. (2001). If It Ain’t Broke...(But It Is). Accountancy, 727(1292), 40.
Cangelosi, J. D., Markham, F. S., & Bounds, W. T. (1998). Factors related to nurse
retention and turnover: an updated study. Health Marketing Quarterly, 15(3), 25-43.
doi: 10.1300/J026vl 5n03_02
Cheng, M. M., Schulz, A. K„ Luckett, P. F„ & Booth, P. (2003). The Effects o f Hurdle
Rates on the Level o f Escalation o f Commitment in Capital Budgeting. Behavioral
Research in Accounting, 75(1), 63-85. doi:10.2308/bria.2003.15.1.63
Christ, M. H., Emett, S. A., Summers, S. L., & Wood, D. A. (2012). The Effects of
Preventive and Detective Controls on Employee Performance and Motivation*.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 29(2), 432-452. doi:10.1111/j. 1911 3846.2011.01106.x

129
Christ, M. H., Sedatole, K. L., & Towry, K. L. (2012). Sticks and Carrots: The Effect o f
Contract Frame on Effort in Incomplete Contracts. The Accounting Review, 87(6),
1913-1938. doi: 10.2308/accr-50219
Christ, M. H., Sedatole, K. L., Towry, K. L., & Thomas, M. (2008). When formal
controls undermine trust and cooperation. Strategic Finance, (January), 38-44.
Classe, A. (2004). Against Human Nature. Accountancy, 733(1329), 32-33.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature o f the Firm. Economica, 4(16), 386-4i05.
doi: 10.1111/j. 1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x
Colquitt, J. A., & Shaw, J. C. (2005). How should organizational justice be measured? In
J. Greenberg & J. A. Colquitt (Eds.), The handbook o f organizational justice (pp.
113-152). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cortvriend, P. (2004). Change management o f mergers: the impact on NHS staff and
their psychological contracts. Health Services Management Research: An Official
Journal o f the Association o f University Programs in Health Administration /
HSMC, AUPHA, 17(3), 177-87. doi: 10.1258/0951484041485593
Cropanzano, R., & Mitchell, M. S. (2005). Social Exchange Theory: An Interdisciplinary
Review. Journal o f Management, 31(6), 874-900. doi: 10.1177/0149206305279602
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (2001). Trust, Control, and Risk in Strategic Alliances: An
Integrated Framework. Organization Studies, 22(2), 251-283.
doi: 10.1177/0170840601222004
Duff, A., & Monk, E. A. (2006). Attitudes o f new appointees to accounting and finance
departments in the higher education sector. The British Accounting Review, 38(2),
193-220.
Ehrlich, C. J. (1994). Creating an employer-employee relationship for the hture. Human
Resource Management, 33(3), 491-501. doi:10.1002/hrm.3930330313
Falk, A., Gachter, S., & Kovacs, J. (1999). Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives in
a repeated game with incomplete contracts. Journal o f Economic Psychology, 20(3),
251-284.
Fallan, L. (2000). Understanding governance structures o f accounting: Trust
relationships, transaction costs, and the make-or-buy decision. Journal o f Applied
Accounting Research, 6(1), 52-84. doi: 10.1108/96754260080001022
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1993). Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing?
An Experimental Investigation. The Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 108(2), 437459. doi: 10.2307/2118338

130
Fein, S. (1996). Effects o f suspicion on attributional thinking and the correspondence
bias. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 70(6), 1164-1184.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.70.6.1164
Fein, S., & Hilton, J. L. (1994). Judging others in the shadow o f suspicion. Motivation
and Emotion, 18(2), 167-198. doi:10.1007/BF02249398
Field, A. (2009). Discovering Statistics Using SPSS, 3rd Edition (3rd ed., p. 856). SAGE
Publications Ltd.
Freese, C., Schalk, R., & Croon, M. (2008). De Tilburgse psychologisch contract
vragenlijst. G edragEn Organisatie, (3), 278-295.
Freese, C., Schalk, R., & Croon, M. (2011). The impact o f organizational changes on
psychological contracts: A longitudinal study. Personnel Review, 40(4), 404-422.
doi: 10.1108/00483481111133318
Gietzmann, M. B. (1996). Incomplete contracts and the make or buy decision:
Governance design and attainable flexibility. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 21(6), 611-626.
Govier, T. (1993). An epistemoloogy o f trust. International Journal o f Moral and Social
Studies, 8(2), 155-174.
Greenberg, J. (1987). A Taxonomy o f Organizational Justice Theories. Academy o f
Management Review, 12( 1), 9-22. doi: 10.5465/AMR. 1987.4306437
Guzzo, R. A., Noonan, K. A., & Elron, E. (1994). Expatriate managers and the
psychological contract. Journal o f Applied Psychology, 79(4), 617-626.
doi: 10.1037/0021 -9010.79.4.617
Hair, J. F., Black, B., Babin, B., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2010). Multivariate
Data Analysis (6th ed., p. 928). Prentice Hall.
Haleblian, J., & Finkelstein, S. (1999). The Influence o f Organizational Acquisition
Experience on Acquisition Performance: A Behavioral Learning Perspective.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 44( 1), 29. doi: 10.2307/2667030
Hart, O. D. (1988). Incomplete Contracts and the Theory o f the Firm. Journal o f Law,
Economics, and Organization, 4(1), 119-139.
Hart, O. D., & Moore, J. (1999). Foundations o f Incomplete Contracts. Review o f
Economic Studies, 66( 1), 115-138. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00080
Hayes, R., & Schaefer, S. (2005). Bonuses and non-public information in publicly traded
firms. Review o f Accounting Studies, 10, 431—464.

131
Herrbach, O. (2001). Audit quality, auditor behaviour and the psychological contract.
European Accounting Review, 10(4), 787-802. doi: 10.1080/09638180127400
Herriot, P. (1995). Psychological Contracts. In N. Nicholson (Ed.), Encyclopedic
dictionary o f organisational behaviour. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Herriot, P., Manning, W. E. G., & Kidd, J. M. (1997). The Content o f the Psychological
Contract. British Journal o f Management, 8(2), 151-162. doi: 10.1111/14678551.0047
Herriot, P., Pemberton, C., & Hawtin, E. (1996). The Career Attitudes and Intentions o f
Managers in the Finance Sector. British Journal o f Management, 7(2), 181-190.
doi: 10.1111/j. 1467-8551.1996.tb00113.x
Holbeche, L., James, P., & Wark, V. (1995). Peering into the future o f careers. People
Management, 7(11), 26-31.
Hon, P. W., Mitchell, T. R., Lee, T. W., & Griffeth, R. W. (n.d.). Redefining Employee
Turnover: Focusing on Proximal Psychological States and an Expanded Criterion
(pp. 1-90).
Hubbard, N., & Purcell, J. (2001). Managing employee expectations during acquisitions.
Human Resource Management Journal, 11(2), 17-33. doi:10.1111/j. 17488583.2001.tb00036.x
Hunter, L. W. (1995). How will competition change human resource management in
retail banking? (pp. 95-104).
Ironson, G. H., Smith, P. C., Brannick, M. T., & Gibson, W. M. (1989). Construction o f a
Job in General scale: A comparison o f global, composite, and specific measures.
Journal o f Applied Psychology, 74(2), 193-200. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.74.2.193
Ittner, C. D., Larcker, D. F., & Rajan, M. V. (1997). No Title. The Accounting Review,
72(2), 231-255.
Judge, T. A., Thoresen, C. J., Pucik, V., & Welbourne, T. M. (1999). Managerial coping
with organizational change: A dispositional perspective. Journal o f Applied
Psychology, 84(1), 107-122. doi: 10.1037/0021 -9010.84.1.107
Kets de Vries, M. F. R., & Balazs, K. (1997). The Downside o f Downsizing. Human
Relations, 50(1), 11-50. doi:10.1177/001872679705000102
Kissler, G. D. (1994). The new employment contract. Human Resource Management,
33(3), 335-352. doi:10.1002/hrm.3930330304

132
Kramer, R. M. (1996). Divergent realities, convergent disappointments in the hierarchic
relation, trust and the intuitive auditor at work. In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler
(Eds.), Trust in Organisations: Frontiers o f Theory and Research (pp. 216-245).
Thousand Oaks, CA.
Lanigan, K. (2007). Mergers and Your Career Tips to Help You Survive and Thrive.
Accountancy Ireland2, 39(4), 54.
Lee, K., & Allen, N. J. (2002). Organizational citizenship behavior and workplace
deviance: The role of affect and cognitions. Journal o f Applied Psychology, 87(1),
131-142. doi: 10.1037//0021-9010.87.1.131
Lester, S. W., Tumley, W. H., Bloodgood, J. M., & Bolino, M. C. (2002). Not seeing eye
to eye: differences in supervisor and subordinate perceptions o f and attributions for
psychological contract breach. Journal o f Organizational Behavior, 25(1), 39-56.
doi: 10.1002/job. 126
Leveck, M. L., & Jones, C. B. (1996). The nursing practice environment, staff retention,
and quality o f care. Research in Nursing & Health, 19(4), 331-43.
doi: 10.1002/(SICI) 1098-240X( 199608) 19:4<331:: AID-NUR7>3.0.CO;2-J
Lindenberg, S. (2001). Intrinsic Motivation in a New Light. Kyklos, 54(2&3), 317-342.
doi:10.1111/1467-6435.00156
Lubich, R. D. (1997). Organizational Commitment: An Examination o f its Linkage to
Turnover Intention. Nova Southestem University.
Luft, J. (1994). Bonus and penalty incentives contract choice by employees. Journal o f
Accounting and Economics, 18(2), 181-206.
Mac Rory, S. (1999). Let’s make this a great place to work! Accountancy Ireland, 31(6),
28-29.
Macaulay, S. (1963). No Title. American Sociological Review, 28( 1), 55-67.
Mackintosh, M. (1993). Economic Behaviour and the Contracting Outcome under the
NHS Reforms: Theory and the Example o f Community Nursing. Accounting,
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 6(3). doi: 10.1108/EUM0000000001938
Marks, M. L., & Mirvis, P. H. (1998). Rebuilding after a merger: dealing with survivor
sickness. Organizational Dynamics, 21(2), 18-32.
Marks, M. L., & Mirvis, P. H. (2011). Merge Ahead: A Research Agenda to Increase
Merger and Acquisition Success. Journal o f Business and Psychology, 26(2), 161—
168. doi: 10.1007/s 10869-011 -9219-4

133
Marlowe, D., & Crowne, D. P. (1964). Social desirability and response to perceived
situational demands (pp. 1-233). New York: Wiley.
Martin, P. (1995). Performance Appraisal. Management Accounting, 73(3), 67.
Martin, P., & Mackean, J. (1988). Can we keep nurses in the health service?: A study o f
nurse retention in two health districts. University o f Southampton: Institute for
Health Policy Studies, Southampton.
Meyer, J. P., & Allen, N. J. (1991). A three-component conceptualization of
organizational commitment. Human Resource Management Review, 7(1), 61-89.
Mirvis, P. H., & Hall, D. T. (1994). Psychological success and the boundaryless career.
Journal o f Organizational Behavior, 75(4), 365-380. doi: 10.1002/job.4030150406
Morrison, D. E. (1994). Psychological contracts and change. Human Resource
Management, 55(3), 353-372. doi:10.1002/hrm.3930330305
Morrison, E. W., & Robinson, S. L. (1997). WHEN EMPLOYEES FEEL BETRAYED:
A MODEL OF HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT VIOLATION
DEVELOPS. Academy o f Management Review, 22(1), 226-256.
doi: 10.5465/AMR. 1997.9707180265
NatWest. (1980). Annual Reports and Accounts. London: National Westminster Bank.
Nesterkin, D. a. (2013). Organizational change and psychological reactance. Journal o f
Organizational Change Management, 26(3), 573-594.
doi: 10.1108/09534811311328588
Organ, D. W. (1988). Organizational citizenship behavior: The good soldier syndrome.
Issues in organization and management series.
Parker, R. J., Nouri, H., & Hayes, A. F. (2011). Distributive Justice, Promotion
Instrumentality, and Turnover Intentions in Public Accounting Firms. Behavioral
Research in Accounting, 23(2), 169-186. doi:10.2308/bria-50020
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect
effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, &
Computers : A Journal o f the Psychonomic Society, Inc, 36(4), 717-31.
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for
assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior
Research Methods, 40(3), 879-891. doi:10.3758/BRM.40.3.879

134
Radcliffe, V. S., Campbell, D. R., & Fogarty, T. J. (2001). Exploring Downsizing: A
Case Study on the Use o f Accounting Information. Journal o f Management
Accounting Research, 73(1), 131-157. doi:10.2308/jmar.2001.13.1.131
ROBINSON, S. L., & Bennett, R. J. (1995). A TYPOLOGY OF DEVIANT
WORKPLACE BEHAVIORS: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING STUDY.
Academy o f Management Journal, 38(2), 555-572. doi: 10.2307/256693
Robinson, S. L., Kraatz, M., & Rousseau, D. M. (1994). Changing obligations and the
psychological contract: A longitudinal study. Academy o f M anagem ent..., 57(1),
137-152.
Robinson, S. L., & Morrison, E. W. (2000). The development o f psychological contract
breach and violation: a longitudinal study, 21(5), 525-546.
Robinson, S. L., & Rousseau, D. M. (1994). Violating the psychological contract: Not the
exception but the norm. Journal o f Organizational Behavior, 15(3), 245-259.
doi: 10.1002/job.4030150306
Roehling, M. V., Cavanaugh, M., Moynihan, L., & Boswell, W. (2000). The Nature o f
the New Employment Relationship: A Content Analysis o f the Practitioner and
Academic Literatures. Human Resource Management, 39(4), 305-320.
Romney, M. B., & Steinbart, P. J. (2009). Accounting Information Systems. Pearson
International Editions.
Rousseau, D. M. (1989). Psychological and implied contracts in organizations. Employee
Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 2(2), 121-139. doi: 10.1007/BF01384942
Rousseau, D. M. (1990). New hire perceptions o f their own and their employer ’ s
obligations : A ... Journal o f Organizational Behavior, 11(5), 389-400.
Rousseau, D. M. (1995). Psychological Contracts in Organisations: Understanding
Written and Unwritten Agreements. London: Sage.
Rousseau, D. M. (2001). Schema, promise and mutuality: The building blocks of the
psychological contract. Journal o f Occupational and Organizational Psychology,
74(4), 511 -541. doi: 10.1348/096317901167505
Rousseau, D. M. (2004). Psychological Contracts in the Workplace: Understanding the
Ties That Motivate. Academy o f Management Executive, 18(1), 120-127.
doi: 10.5465/AME.2004.12689213
Rousseau, D. M., & Greller, M. M. (1994). Human resource practices: Administrative
contract makers. Human Resource Management, 33(3), 385—401.
doi:10.1002/hrm.3930330308

135
Russell, S. S., Spitzmuller, C., Lin, L. F., Stanton, J. M., Smith, P. C., & Ironson, G. H.
(2004). Shorter can Also be Better: The Abridged Job in General Scale. Educational
and Psychological Measurement, 64(5), 878-893. doi:10.1177/0013164404264841
Saunders, M. N. K., & Thornhill, A. (2003). Organisational justice, trust and the
management o f change: An exploration. Personnel Review, 32(3), 360-375.
doi: 10.1108/00483480310467660
Schalk, R., Campbell, J. W., & Freese, C. (1998). Change and employee behaviour.
Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 19(3), 157-163.
doi: 10.1108/01437739810210202
Schofield, P. (1996). Managers Without Portfolio. Accountancy, 7/7(1230), 34-38.
Searle, R. H., & Ball, K. S. (2004). The development o f trust and distrust in a merger.
Journal o f Managerial Psychology, 19(1), 708-721.
doi: 10.1108/02683940410559392
Shield, R., Thorpe, R., & Nelson, A. (2002). Flospital mergers and psychological
contracts. Strategic Change, 11(1), 357-367. doi:10.1002/jsc.611
Smith, R. (1993). “I am a human being: do not fold, bend or mutilate.” Management
Accounting, 71(2), 47.
Sparrow, P. R. (1996a). Careers and the psychological contract: Understanding the
european context. European Journal o f Work and Organizational Psychology, 5(4),
479-500. doi: 10.1080/13594329608414874
Sparrow, P. R. (1996b). Transitions In the Psychological Contract: Some Evidence From
the Banking Sector. Human Resource Management Journal, 6(4), 75-92.
doi: 10.1111/j.1748-8583.1996.tb00419.x
Staw, B. M., Sutton, R. I., & Kramer, R. M. (2001). 1. Organizational paranoia: Origins
and dynamics. Research in Organizational Behavior, 23, 1-42.
Suazo, M. M., & Stone-Romero, E. F. (2011). Implications o f psychological contract
breach: A perceived organizational support perspective. Journal o f Managerial
Psychology, 26(5), 366-382. doi: 10.1108/02683941111138994
Turnley, W. H., & Feldman, D. C. (1998). Psychological contract violations during
corporate restructuring. Human Resource Management, 37(1), 71-83.
doi: 10.1002/(SICI) 1099-050X( 199821 )37:1<71:: AID-HRM7>3,3.CO;2-5
Vitale, R., & Laux, J. (2012). The Economic Efficacy O f Banking Mergers: 2006-2008.
Journal o f Applied Business Research (JABR), 28(6), 1211-1215.

136
Vosselman, E., & Meer-Kooistra, J. van der. (2006). Efficiency seeking behaviour in
changing management control in interfirm transactional relationships: An extended
transaction cost economics perspective. Journal o f Accounting & Organizational
Change, 2(2), 123-143. doi:10.1108/18325910610675970
Wicklund, R. A. (1974). Freedom and reactance. (L. Erlbaum, Ed.) (p. 205). Potomac.
Wiesenfeld, B., & Brocker, J. (1993). Procedural unfairness and the psychology o f the
contingent worker. Atlanta: Academey o f Management Meetings.
Williams, L. J., & Anderson, S. E. (1991). Job Satisfaction and Organizational
Commitment as Predictors o f Organizational Citizenship and In-Role Behaviors.
Journal o f Management, 17(3), 601-617.
Williams, S. J., & Adams, C. A. (2013). Moral accounting? Employee disclosures from a
stakeholder accountability perspective. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability
Journal (Vol. 26, pp. 449^195). doi: 10.1108/09513571311311892
Williamson, O. E. (1981). The Economics o f Organization: The Transaction Cost
Approach. American Journal o f Sociology, 87(3), 548-577.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions o f capitalism. New York: Free Pass.

APPENDIX A

BASIC STATISTICS

137

138

Basic Statistics
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Psychological Contract Breach (Robinson and Morrison 2000)
5-point scale (l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree,
4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)
1.) Almost all o f the promises about [psychological contract breach] made by my
employer during recruitment have been kept so far. (reverse scored)
2.) I feel that my employer has come through in fulfilling the promises about
[psychological contract breach] made me to when I was hired, (reverse scored)
3.) So far my employer has done an excellent job o f fulfilling their promises about
[psychological contract breach], (reverse scored)
4.) I have not received everything promised to me about [psychological contract breach]
in exchange for my contributions.
5.) My employer has broken many o f its promises to me about [psychological contract
breach] even though I’ve upheld my side o f the deal.

Feelings of Violation (Robinson and Morrison 2000)
5-point scale (l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree,
4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)
1.) I feel a great deal o f anger toward my organization over [psychological contract
breach],
2.) I feel betrayed by my organization with regard to [psychological contract breach],
3.) I feel that my organization has violated the contract about [psychological contract
breach] between us.
4.) I feel extremely frustrated by how I have been treated by my organization relating to
[psychological contract breach].

Employee Performance (Williams and Anderson 1991)
5-point scale (l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree,
4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)
1.) I adequately complete all o f my assigned duties.
2.) I fulfill all the responsibilities specified in my job description.
3.) I perform the tasks that are expected o f me.
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4.) I meet the formal performance requirements o f my job.
5.) I engage in activities that will directly affect my performance evaluation, (dropped)
6.) I neglect aspects o f the job that I am obligated to perform, (reverse scored)
7.) I fail to perform essential duties o f my job. (reverse scored)

Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (Lee and Allen 2002)
7-point scale (l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly Disagree, 4=Neither Agree
nor Disagree, 5=Slightly Agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly Agree)
1.) I attend functions that are not required but that help the organizational image.
2.) I keep up with developments in this organization.
3.) I defend the organization when other employees criticize it.
4.) I show pride when representing the organization in public.
5.) I offer ideas to improve the functioning o f the organization.
6.) I express loyalty toward the organization.
7.) I take action to protect the organization from potential problems.
8.) I demonstrate concern about the image o f the organization

Job Satisfaction (Russell et al. 2004)
3-point scale (0=No, 1=?, 3=Yes)
Indicate whether the following adjectives and short phrases describe(d) your job during
the merger or acquisition.
1.) Good
2.) Undesirable (reverse scored)
3.) Better than most
4.) Disagreeable (reverse scored)
5.) Makes me content
6.) Excellent
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7.) Enjoyable
8.) Poor (reverse scored)

Organizational Deviance (Bennett and Robinson 2000)
7-point scale (l=Never, 2=Once a year, 3=Twice a year, 4=Several times a year,
5=Monthly, 6=Weekly, 7=Daily)
Indicate how often you did/do the following activities during the merger or acquisition.
1.) Taken property from work without permission, (dropped)
2.) Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead o f working.
3.) Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed fo r more money than you spent on business
expenses, (dropped)
4.) Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace.
5.) Come in late to work without permission.
6.) Littered your work environment, (dropped)
7.) Neglected to follow your boss’s instructions.
8.) Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked.
9.) Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person.
(dropped)
10.) Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job. (dropped)
11.) Put little effort into your work.
12.) Dragged out work in order to get overtime.

Organizational Justice (Ambrose and Schminke 2009)
5-point scale (l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree,
4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)
1.) Overall, I’m treated fairly by my organization.
2.) Usually, the way things work in this organization are not fair, (reverse scored)
3.) In general, I can count on my organization to be fair.

143
4.) In general, the treatment I receive around here is fair.
5.) For the most part, this organization treats its employees fairly.
6.) Most o f the people who work here would say they are often treated unfairly,
(reverse scored)
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Psychological Contract Breach Item Correlations
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